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INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR INNOVATION: 
A RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING 
§ 101 PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
KRISTEN OSENGA* 
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is a mess, and it is weakening 
patent rights in this country.  Nearly everyone, from the bar to the bench and 
from academia to industry, has called for reform.  Multiple proposals to amend 
35 U.S.C. § 101 have been drafted, each aimed at trying to make the doctrine 
more workable.  Although offered with the best intentions, the proposals to fix 
patent-eligible subject matter are doomed to fail because none of the proposals 
address which institution is best suited to determine patent eligibility. 
This Article takes a different, and perhaps radical, tactic.  Specifically, 
patent-eligible subject matter inquiries should be vested solely in the courts.  The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) should not consider patent 
eligibility of patent applications or issued patents.  Although this solution seems 
incongruous, in looking at the particular institutional competencies of the courts 
versus the various components of the Patent Office, it becomes clear that if the 
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is to be fixed, the courts are in the best 
position to do so.  In addition to being particularly suited to determine patent 
eligibility, vesting these decisions in the courts should result in a more workable 
and certain test for patent eligibility, which in turn should strengthen patent 
rights and enhance innovation. 
 
 
                                               
 *  Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; Senior Scholar, Center 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States—the land of innovation—has an innovation 
problem.  Two reports recently published announced that the country 
has fallen from its previous position as a leader in innovation.  One report, 
the 2018 Bloomberg Innovation Index, stated that the United States 
dropped out of the top ten innovative countries for the first time in the 
six-year history of the index.1  The other report, the United States 
Chamber of Commerce’s Global IP Index for 2018, stated that the 
country remained atop the list generally but fell significantly with respect 
to patent protection.2  In fact, in the Chamber’s index, the United States 
dropped completely out of the top ten with respect to countries offering 
strong patent protection to innovators, falling to a tie for twelfth with 
Italy.3  Additional reports indicate innovative firms are leaving the United 
States and shifting their operations overseas to Europe and China.4 
What is behind the collapse of the United States as an innovation 
leader?  In part, it is due to the erosion of effective and reliable patent 
protection available to inventors and innovators.5  There is a strong 
correlation between effective patent rights and growing innovation 
                                               
 1. Michelle Jamrisko & Wei Lu, The U.S. Drops out of the Top 10 in Innovation 
Ranking, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ne 
ws/articles/2018-01-22/south-korea-tops-global-innovation-ranking-again-as-u-s-falls. 
 2. U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., GLOBAL INNOVATION POL’Y CTR., CREATE:  U.S. 
CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 6, 35–36, 156–57 (6th ed. 2018), 
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_ 
2018.pdf [hereinafter CREATE]. 
 3. Id. at 35. 
 4. See Ryan Davis, Experts Look to Congress to Stem Patent-Eligibility ‘Chaos,’ LAW360 
(Apr. 20, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1035947. 
 5. Strength of patent protection (or lack thereof) is directly implicated in the 
Chamber’s index.  See CREATE, supra note 2, at 156; see also Chris Coons, A Few 
Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Section 101 Jurisprudence, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/08/thoughts-supreme-courts-section-101-
jurisprudence (noting that the erosion of patent protection, caused in part by the state 
of patent-eligible subject matter, has “worrisome implications for long-term investment 
in research and development, negatively influencing American predominance in 
emerging technologies”).  In the Bloomberg Index, the United States remained strong 
in the category of patent activity (meaning that many patent applications were filed); 
the lower categories, however, included tertiary efficiency and research 
concentration—how many people are going into and working in science and 
technology research and development (R&D).  See Jamrisko & Lu, supra note 1.  There 
is certainly a relationship between workers in the R&D field, spending on research and 
development, and innovation. 
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economies, including investment in new ideas.6  One particular area 
of patent law that has contributed to the erosion of reliable patent 
rights is patent-eligible subject matter—or what types of inventions can 
be patented.  Patent-eligible subject matter, as others have recognized, 
is a “real mess.”7  It is chaotic,8 “a foggy standard cloaked as a rule,”9 “rife 
with indeterminacy,”10 and in a “state of crisis.”11  Even U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) judges, who are partially 
responsible for the state of the doctrine, have expressed concern about the 
level of confusion surrounding the doctrine.12  Importantly, the issue of 
patent-eligible subject matter disproportionately affects two industries that 
represent a substantial sector of the United States economic and innovation 
base:  biotechnology and computer-related inventions.13 
                                               
 6. See Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811, 
814 (2016). 
 7. Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr. 
12, 2016, 4:32 PM) (quoting David Kappos, former Director of the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office), https://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-
abolition-of-section-101-of-patent-act. 
 8. See The Impact of Bad Patents on American Businesses:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intell. Prop., & the internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) 
(supplemental statement of Judge Paul R. Michel), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Supplemental-Statement-of-Paul-R-Michel-Sept-12-
2017.pdf (“Patent-eligibility law under § 101 has descended into chaos after a string of 
Supreme Court decisions.”). 
 9. Michael Risch, Nothing is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45, 45 (2015). 
 10. Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead:  How Patent Eligibility Doctrine 
Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941 (2017). 
 11. David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2151 
(2017) [hereinafter Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility] (“In short, patent law—and in 
particular the law governing patent eligibility—is in a state of crisis.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie, 
J., concurring) (per curiam) (“I believe the law needs clarification by higher authority, 
perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field 
consider are § 101 problems.”); see also Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Judges’ Plea to Reps Shows 
Patent-Eligibility Angst, LAW360 (June 4, 2018, 7:47 PM), https://www.law360.com 
/articles/1049274 (quoting Edward R. Reines, who stated, “For a well-respected 
Federal Circuit judge to suggest that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is unworkable 
and requires legislative attention is a matter of courage”); Gene Quinn, Judge Stoll tells 
AIPLA Alice/Mayo ‘a difficult line of cases to administer’, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 26, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/10/26/judge-stoll-aipla-alice-may (quoting Judge 
Stoll as saying “One of the more challenging issues I’ve seen since I’ve been at the 
court is the 101 test and the Alice/Mayo test.  It is a difficult line of cases to administer”). 
 13. See Jason D. Reinecke, Comment, Is the Supreme Court’s Patentable Subject Matter 
Test Overly Ambiguous?  An Empirical Test, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123524. 
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The current chaos that is patent-eligible subject matter arose largely 
from a series of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court between 2010 
and 2014, followed by aftershocks driven by the lower courts and the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) as these 
institutions tried to figure out what the Supreme Court had actually 
decided.  This rapidly developing (or perhaps devolving depending on 
your perspective) jurisprudence had two destabilizing effects on patent 
law and on innovation more broadly.  First, there is immense confusion 
about precisely what the test for patent-eligible subject matter is and 
how it should be applied.14  Second, a number of previously-issued 
patents have been invalidated for lack of patent-eligible subject matter, 
raising questions about the viability of extant patent rights in many 
important industries.15  These two issues are having negative effects on 
the certainty, reliability, and strength of patent rights in this country.16 
The first issue—uncertainty as to the test for patent-eligible subject 
matter and how it is to be applied—should come as no surprise given 
the nebulous test that has been imposed by the Supreme Court.  
Specifically, the current test comprises two parts.  The first part of the 
test asks whether the claims are directed to an ineligible concept, 
including laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.17  If 
the first question is answered in the affirmative, the second part asks 
                                               
 14. For just a few of the many articles highlighting the uncertain state of patent-
eligible subject matter, see, for example, Ted G. Dane, Are the Federal Circuit’s Recent 
Section 101 Decisions a “Specific Improvement” in Patent Eligibility Law?, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 
331 (2017); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad:  A Reinvigorated 
Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1796 (2014); Robert Mazzola, 
The 101 Conundrum:  Creating a Framework to Solve Problems Surrounding the Interpretation 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 400 (2015); David O. Taylor, Confusing 
Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157 (2016) [hereinafter Taylor, Confusing Patent 
Eligibility].  But see Reinecke, supra note 13, at 3 (using an empirical study to claim that 
“the new test for patentable subject matter seems less unpredictable than 
commentators have suggested”). 
 15. See generally Bilski Blog, FENWICK & WEST LLP, www.bilskiblog.com (last visited 
May 20, 2019) (enter “invalidation rate” in search bar) (regularly reporting 
invalidation rates of issued patents for lack of patent-eligible subject matter). 
 16. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
256, 257 (2015) (discussing the impact of the bar on diagnostic testing patents on 
innovation); MICHEL, supra note 8, at 3–4 (“The legal uncertainty [arising from the 
chaos of § 101] is devastating American business, including high tech, manufacturing, 
biotech, and pharmaceutical industries.”). 
 17. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216–18 (2014). 
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whether the claim’s other elements transform that claim into a patent-
eligible practical application of an otherwise ineligible concept.18 
Sadly, the Supreme Court intended to clarify the doctrine of patent-
eligible subject matter when it announced the current two-step inquiry, 
but this test and how it is to be applied is anything but clear.  While the 
question of part one invokes uncertainty about what these three 
categories of ineligible concepts include, the question of part two is 
indeterminate in even what it is seeking.  A former Chief Judge of the 
Federal Circuit described the test as “too vague, too subjective, too 
unpredictable and impossible to administer in a coherent consistent 
way.”19  Not surprisingly, others have likened the two-part test to Justice 
Stewart’s test for obscenity:  “I know it when I see it.”20  Courts have 
offered little guidance for implementing these two questions, beyond 
stating that routine or conventional steps will be insufficient to render 
a claim patent eligible.21 
The second type of uncertainty, resulting from the invalidation of 
many existing patents, is a different matter altogether.  Based on the 
Supreme Court’s quadrilogy of patent-eligible subject matter opinions 
decided in the last decade, the Patent Office and all levels of courts 
have been invalidating many patents as directed to ineligible subject 
matter.22  Patents are property rights,23 but are also legal rights that 
businesses use for a variety of purposes, including to prevent others 
from copying their innovative technology, to signal technological 
competence or market strength to investors and the public, to defend 
against infringement lawsuits, and to increase cross-licensing 
negotiation power.24  In fact, there is a demonstrated relationship 
                                               
 18. See id. 
 19. See Gene Quinn, Judge Michel says Alice Decision ‘Will Create Total Chaos,’ IP 
WATCHDOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/08/06/judge-michel-
says-alice-decision-will-create-total-chaos (suggesting the Alice decision created a two-
step test that is nonsensical). 
 20. See Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, supra note 14, at 161 (citing Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Robert L. Maier, Will Any Software Patents Survive?, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 21, 2017, 
2:00 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2017/ 
11/21/will-any-software-patents-survive (discussing the “trend of district courts and the 
Federal Circuit regularly invalidating software patents” under § 101). 
 23. See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 
(2013) (“Patents have long been identified as property rights in American law.”). 
 24. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs:  An 
Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 111, 114–15 (2010). 
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between a start-up company having a patent and a higher probability 
of it receiving venture capital funding and ultimately succeeding as a 
business.25  Whether a start-up company or an established firm, patents 
are extremely important to many firms’ existence.  To the extent that 
firms fear that granted patents will be taken away from them, the 
patents then lose their value for the various purposes for which they 
are being used.  This in turn may hamper a business’s ability to 
commercialize its technology and deter investment in additional 
innovation, or may even spell the end of the firm itself. 
The uncertainties surrounding patent-eligible subject matter have 
led to multiple calls—from academia, from the bar, from industry, and 
more—to fix this doctrine.26  However, the various proposals aimed at 
fixing patent-eligible subject matter are doomed to fail.  Specifically, 
the current proposals generally add more words to the current statute 
and are likely to result in tests just as vague and unworkable as the 
current statute, with additional words to be misinterpreted.27  More 
importantly, however, is that none of the proposals have examined 
which institution or institutions would be best suited for determining 
patent-eligible subject matter.  Even if a clear and appropriate test 
could be drafted, if the wrong institution is wielding it, the problem is 
unlikely to be resolved. 
Instead of simply adding to the cacophony of ineffective reform 
proposals, this article advances a radical solution that calls for situating 
patent-eligible subject matter inquiries with the institution best suited 
for the task and in a way that also may enhance and incentivize 
innovation.  Specifically, this article argues patent eligibility inquiries 
should not be undertaken by the Patent Office.  This means two things:  
before a patent is issued, the question of patent eligibility should not 
be considered by the examiner or by the Patent Trial and Appeals 
Board (PTAB or Board), and after a patent is issued, patent-eligible 
subject matter should not be the basis for any post-grant review at the 
Patent Office.  Instead, to the extent patent-eligible subject matter is 
in question, these decisions must be made by the courts. 
It may seem incongruous to situate patent-eligible subject matter 
with the courts, especially as the courts have created a large portion of 
                                               
 25. See Joan Farre-Mensa et al., What is a Patent Worth?  Evidence from the U.S. Patent 
“Lottery” 26–27, 30 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Off. Econ. Working Paper No. 2015-5, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2704028. 
 26. See infra Section II (providing an overview of various reform efforts). 
 27. See id. 
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the mess associated with the doctrine.  However, in looking at how to 
best fix an uncertain doctrine to align with the purpose of patent law 
and applying various tenets of institutional design, the courts become 
the optimal choice for this undertaking.  Administrative law provides 
additional support for courts to take on this task as well.  Vesting the 
decision-making power with the courts ensures that the issue is before 
the best institution for the task.  Furthermore, this should incentivize 
courts to craft a more workable and certain test for patent-eligible subject 
matter, strengthen patent rights, and ultimately, enhance innovation. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides a background 
of patent-eligible subject matter, including what the doctrine entails, 
which institutions currently address the question of subject matter 
eligibility, and what sort of mess the doctrine is in.  Part II explains 
recently proposed reform efforts for patent-eligible subject matter and 
why these reforms are unlikely to make a difference for the disastrous 
doctrine.  Part III describes a radical solution—that determinations of 
patent-eligible subject matter should not be made at the Patent 
Office—as well as why this solution makes a lot of sense.  This Part also 
explains why taking this radical step, and taking patent eligibility 
decisions away from the Patent Office, is more likely to provide more 
clarity to the doctrine than the other proposed reforms, is apt to 
strengthen patent law, and will put the United States back at the top of 
the list of innovative countries.  Finally, this Article ends with a 
discussion of recent changes at the Patent Office, and how these 
changes could ultimately be used to operationalize the solution 
proposed in this Article. 
I.    THE WHAT, THE WHO, AND THE UGLY OF 
PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
To comprehend why patent-eligible subject matter is a problem and 
why it must be fixed, it is essential first to understand how and where 
patent-eligible subject matter fits within the patent law system.  This 
Part will first explain the law of patent-eligible subject matter, how it 
relates to other requirements of patentability, and how it evolved to its 
current state.  Next, this Part will describe the various institutions that 
currently decide patent-eligible subject matter and how well these 
institutions have been doing in this endeavor.  Finally, this Part will 
examine some of the effects that have sprung from the patent-eligible 
subject matter decisions by these various institutions, as well as detail 
how these effects are influencing innovation in the United States. 
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A.   The Law of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
The United States Patent Act specifies the laws related to obtaining 
and enforcing patent rights.28  There are four primary statutory 
provisions that describe the legal requirements for patentability—35 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112.  Courts have interpreted § 102 as 
requiring novelty or that the invention be new; § 103 as requiring non-
obviousness or that the patent not cover a trivial alteration of a previously-
known invention; and § 112 as requiring an adequate level of disclosure 
to fulfill the quid pro quo aspect of patents.29  Section 101 pulls double 
duty, imposing a requirement of utility as well as delineating what types of 
inventions can be patented, or patent-eligible subject matter.30 
Section 101 states that whoever invents a new “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” or improvement thereof may 
obtain a patent, subject to the remaining requirements of 
patentability.31  Courts have interpreted this list of categories broadly, 
going so far as to claim that “anything under the sun that is made by 
man” falls into patent-eligible subject matter.32  In the early 1980s, the 
Supreme Court quoted the “anything under the sun” language when 
opening the doors to broad swaths of modern invention, including 
biotechnology and computer software.33 
Although the statute is broad, there are a few judicially-created 
exceptions to this otherwise expansive understanding of patent-
eligible subject matter.  Specifically, laws of nature, natural 
phenomenon, and abstract ideas may not be patented.34  These 
exceptions were not understood to have significant limiting effects on 
patent-eligible subject matter, as courts and the Patent Office deemed 
most inventions eligible for patenting through the 1980s and 1990s.35  
                                               
 28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–389 (2012). 
 29. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 
EMORY L.J. 987, 990, 993 (2016). 
 30. See Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, supra note 14, at 170–71. 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 32. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 33. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 184 (1981) (allowing patenting of a 
computer algorithm that controlled a rubber mold); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305, 309–
10 (allowing patenting of oil-eating bacterium). 
 34. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). 
 35. One last area of uncertainty were business methods.  However, after the 
Federal Circuit ruled these inventions were eligible for patenting in the State Street Bank 
& Trust case, invalidation under § 101 was essentially a “dead letter.”  See Mark A. 
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This began to change in the early 2000s, when a variety of groups called 
for a tightening of patentability standards for a number of reasons.36  
The courts seemed to heed these calls, first merely suggesting and later 
implementing a stricter view of patent-eligible subject matter.37  The 
judicially-created exceptions then took on new importance through 
the quartet of Supreme Court cases that ultimately led to the 
aforementioned two-step test for patent-eligible subject matter. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Bilski v. Kappos,38 affirming the 
Patent Office’s rejection of a patent application because it claimed an 
“abstract idea” and therefore was not eligible for patenting.39  The 
invention at issue in Bilski was a method of hedging risk when trading 
commodities, and the claims did not require any particular structures 
to implement.40  The Court reasoned that the claims were directed to 
                                               
Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011) (permitting business 
method patents on inventions that produced “a useful, concrete, and tangible result,” 
including numbers); see also State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Co., 149 
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 36. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14–15 (2003) (contending that “software 
and business method patents can raise significant competitive concerns and deter 
innovation, especially because so much of the innovation in those fields builds 
incrementally on preceding work”). 
 37. In 2006, in a case that was dismissed as improvidently granted, Justice Breyer 
dissented from the dismissal to argue for a more stringent patent-eligible subject 
matter requirement.  See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 
124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The Federal Circuit then picked up the reins, 
finding ineligible subject matter in a number of cases.  See generally Bilski, 545 F.3d at 
943; In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), superseded by In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 38. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 39. Id. at 609. 
 40. Claim 1 of the application at issue in Bilski is representative: 
1.     A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold 
by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and 
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said 
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate 
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; 
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk 
position to said consumers; and 
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said 
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant 
transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions. 
Ex Parte Bernard L. Bilski & Rand A. Warsaw, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *1 
(B.P.A.I. 2006). 
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an abstract idea that was “a fundamental economic practice long 
prevalent in our system of commerce.”41  To allow a patent on 
something like this would, according to the Court, preempt the public 
from using a basic economic concept.42 
The Bilski case was followed two years later by Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,43 where the Supreme Court 
determined the claimed invention was directed to an ineligible “law of 
nature.”44  The patent at issue in the Mayo case claimed a diagnostic 
method, involving the steps of administering a drug, measuring the 
level of a metabolite associated with the drug, and, depending on that 
level, deciding to increase or decrease the drug’s dosage in that 
patient.45  The Court examined these steps and determined that, 
beyond the law of nature—that is, the correlation between the 
metabolite level and the optimal dosing of the drug—the claim simply 
recited “well-understood, routine, and conventional activity” and thus, 
it was not eligible for patenting.46 
One year after, the Supreme Court in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.47 determined a patent was invalid because it 
claimed a “product of nature.”48  In the Myriad case, the ineligible 
claims were directed to isolated DNA segments.49  Although Myriad 
                                               
 41. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611. 
 42. See id. at 611–12 
 43. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 44. Id. at 77. 
 45. See id. at 74–75 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, col. 20, ll. 10–20).  Claim 
1 of the patent is exemplary: 
1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject. 
 46. Id. at 73–74. 
 47. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 48. Id. at 580. 
 49. Id. at 584 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, col. 153, ll. 56–58).  “The first 
claim asserts a patent on ‘[a]n isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide,’ which 
has ‘the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.’”  Id. 
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discovered the location and sequence of some particularly important 
genes, the subject of the patent claims was not created via invention.50 
Finally, in 2014, the Supreme Court again found an invention to be 
ineligible subject matter due to being an “abstract idea” in Alice Corp. 
v. CLS Bank Int’l.51  The invention in this case was a method and system 
for managing settlement risks when two parties conduct a financial 
transaction.52  The Court determined that the method was an abstract 
idea and consisted of “purely conventional” steps to be performed on 
a generic computer, and thus was ineligible for patent protection.53  As 
to the system claims, the Court held that these failed for the same 
reason as the method claims:  the general computer system described 
added nothing to the underlying abstract idea.54  Again, in making this 
determination, the Court relied on the notion of preemption, or the 
                                               
 50. Id. 
 51. 573 U.S. 208, 227 (2014). 
 52. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam) (discussing U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479, col. 65, ll. 23–50).  Claim 33 of the ‘479 
patent was deemed exemplary: 
A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a 
credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit 
records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the 
method comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution 
from the exchange institutions; 
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for 
each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the 
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit 
record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do 
not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value 
of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place 
in chronological order; and 
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing one[] of the 
exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and 
debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of 
the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, 
time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions. 
Id. at 1285. 
 53. Alice, 573 U.S. at 222. 
 54. Id. at 226 (“Put another way, the system claims are no different from the 
method claims in substance.  The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented 
on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer 
components configured to implement the same idea.”). 
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monopolization of a fundamental concept in the relevant field.55  
Citing back to Mayo, the Court noted that routine conventional activity, 
trivial post-operation actions, and generic or vague limitations are 
insufficient to add substantive limitations and avoid preemption.56 
This quartet of cases, or quadrilogy, although most specifically the 
Alice case, introduced chaos into the doctrine of patent-eligible subject 
matter.57  Claiming to rely on its opinion in the Mayo case, the Supreme 
Court in Alice articulated the two-step test that is currently the basis of 
patent-eligible subject matter decisions.58  The first step involves 
determining whether the patent claim is directed to an ineligible 
concept, specifically a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract 
idea.59  If so, the second step involves determining whether there are 
additional elements that transform the claim into an eligible 
application of the underlying ineligible concept.60  This second step is 
described as a “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 
[underlying concept] itself.”61  Put more plainly, is the invention 
“something more” than simply the ineligible law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea?62 
Despite the appeal and seeming simplicity of a two-step test, the 
inquiry into patent-eligible subject matter is anything but plain.  In 
fact, the Supreme Court has not fully explained either of the two steps.  
As to whether the claim is directed to an ineligible concept, in each 
case of the quadrilogy, the Supreme Court reverted to the oft-repeated 
tenet that laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas are 
not patentable.63  However, in the time since these judicially created 
exceptions were pronounced, the Court has provided very little 
                                               
 55. Id. at 216. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Many better, and more complete, discussions of this quartet of cases have been 
written by other scholars.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus:  A 
Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 647, 651–57 (2015); Lidiya 
Mishchenko, Alice:  Through the Formalist Looking-Glass, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 214, 221–24 (2015); Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, supra note 14, at 178. 
 58. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. 
 59. Id. at 217–18. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)). 
 62. See id. at 217. 
 63. See id. at 216–17. 
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guidance about what exactly these terms mean.  In fact, in Alice, the 
Court specifically declined to define these excluded categories, 
preferring to analogize the invention in the instant case with previous 
cases rather than provide clarity about what makes an invention 
“abstract.”64  As to the second step, requiring that the claimed invention 
include “something more” virtually invites confusion and uncertainty.  
With a lack of guidance provided at both steps, it is not surprising that 
the lower courts have struggled to apply these exceptions to patent-
eligible subject matter.65  The Supreme Court overruled previous efforts 
by lower courts to add clarity to this area of law.66 
Following Alice, the Patent Office and the courts have found patent-
eligible subject matter to be lacking in the vast majority of cases 
considered.67  The bulk of these invalidity cases center around 
inventions related to computer and information technology or 
biotechnology.68  This is not surprising given the judicially created 
exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter include abstract ideas 
(computer and information technology), laws of nature, and natural 
phenomenon (biotechnology).  It is problematic that these subject 
areas are particularly affected, given the extent to which they form a 
large portion of today’s innovation economy. 
What is more troubling, because it is so unexpected, is that courts 
and the Patent Office are using § 101 to invalidate patents (and reject 
patent applications) in a wide range of non-computer, non-biotechnology 
fields.  In fact, invalidations for lack of patent-eligible subject matter now 
appear in technologies that have long formed the heart of the American 
                                               
 64. See id. at 221 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours 
of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.  It is enough to recognize that there is no 
meaningful distinction between” the invention in Bilski and the invention in Alice). 
 65. See, e.g., Kelly Mackin, Federal Circuit Guidance is Needed Because District Courts are 
Misapplying Alice, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/20 
16/04/07/district-courts-misapplying-alice (detailing the rampant invalidation of 
claims from hundreds of patents). 
 66. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (declining to utilize the “machine 
or transformation” test imposed by the Federal Circuit to clarify patent-eligible subject 
matter for inventions that include potentially abstract ideas). 
 67. See, e.g., Bilski Blog, supra note 15 (reporting statistics on invalidations and 
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 68. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying 
Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 774–76 (2018); see also Chad Gilles, Mayo and Alice Had 
Little Impact on Prosecution (Except for a Few Art Units), BIGPATENTDATA (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://bigpatentdata.com/2018/10/subject-matter-eligibility-is-not-that-big-of-a-deal 
-except-for-a-few-art-units (noting that some art units in the computer and information 
technology space, including units 3620, 3680, and 3690, “went absolutely bananas after Alice”). 
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patent system, such as automobiles.  In American Axle & Manufacturing, 
Inc., v. Neapco Holdings LLC,69 a district court judge invalidated patents on 
a technology to reduce vibrations being transmitted through the 
drivetrain of a car.70  Despite the fact that the claims were specifically 
directed to making a part of a car’s driveline system,71 the judge 
determined under the first step of the test that these claims were directed 
to laws of nature, specifically Hooke’s law and friction damping.72  The 
judge then determined that the claims “are applications of Hooke’s law 
with the result of friction damping.”73  However, the judge neglected to 
consider the claim as a whole, which was instead directed toward an 
industrial process for manufacturing car parts.74  This is what patent-
eligible subject matter jurisprudence looks like today. 
Although this section attempts to provide a brief understanding of 
the current state of patent-eligible subject matter, in truth, it is not 
easily understood.  At a June 11, 2018, meeting of the Intellectual 
Property Business Congress (IPBC) Global Conference, Patent Office 
Director Andrei Iancu remarked about how difficult it is to explain 
what qualifies as patent-eligible subject matter, quoting James 
Madison:  “It will be of little avail to the people if the laws are so 
incoherent that they cannot be understood.”75  This section now turns 
to the various institutions that apply this confusing area of law to patent 
applications and issued patents. 
                                               
 69. 309 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D. Del. 2018). 
 70. Id. at 221, 229. 
 71. For example, a representative claim (claim 22) follows: 
A method for manufacturing a shaft assembly of a driveline system, the 
driveline system further including a first driveline component and a second 
driveline component, the shaft assembly being adapted to transmit torque 
between the first driveline component and the second driveline component, 
the method comprising: 
providing a hollow shaft member; 
tuning a mass and a stiffness of at least one liner; and 
inserting the at least one liner into the shaft member; 
wherein the at least one liner is a tuned resistive absorber for attenuating shell 
mode vibrations and wherein the at least one liner is a tuned reactive absorber 
for attenuating bending mode vibrations. 
Id. at 221. 
 72. Id. at 225. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at 225–28. 
 75. See Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks at the 
Intellectual Property Business Conference (June 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/ 
about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-andrei-iancu-ipbc-global-conference. 
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B.   Institutions Deciding Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
There are three primary institutions that determine patent-eligible 
subject matter:  the Patent Office examining corps, the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (PTAB), and the courts.  Although the Patent Office 
is a single agency, the characteristics of the examining corps and the 
PTAB, as well as the instances in which they assess patent-eligible 
subject matter, vary sufficiently to discuss them as different institutions 
for the purpose of this Article.  This section will describe these three 
institutions, as well as one other unique institution that decides patent-
eligible subject matter with less frequency—the International Trade 
Commission.  This section will conclude with an explanation of how 
these institutions decide the issue of patent eligibility at various points 
during a patent’s life cycle. 
1. Patent Office—Examining Corps 
The examining corps at the Patent Office is often the first institution to 
consider the subject matter eligibility of an invention.  An examiner 
determines whether a patent application satisfies the patentability 
requirements, including novelty, non-obviousness, and adequate disclosure, 
as well as whether the invention claimed in the application satisfies § 101.76 
Patent examiners must be U.S. citizens and have successfully 
completed a four-year course of study “at an accredited college or 
university leading to a bachelor’s degree, or higher, that included a 
major field of study . . . in a variety of engineering and science 
disciplines.”77  No advanced technological training is required, nor is 
any legal training or knowledge.78  Patent examiners do, however, go 
through a training program that includes teaching sessions about the 
law and examination procedures, as well as hands-on training by 
working on actual patent applications under close supervision.79 
                                               
 76. Gene Quinn, USPTO Wants YOU for the Patent Examining Corp, IP WATCHDOG 
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/04/uspto-wants-you-for-the-
patent-examing-corp/id=8729. 
 77. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS:  EXAMINER 
BROCHURE, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Examiner%20br 
ochure%202017.pdf (last visited May 20, 2019) [hereinafter ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 
1601, 1620–21 (2016). 
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Patent examiners are guided in their work by policy statements, 
guidelines, and manuals issued by the Patent Office.80  The most 
prevalent guidance document is the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure, which does not have the force of law, but is considered 
within the Patent Office to be the “bible” of patent examination.81  The 
examining corps may also avail itself of additional guidance in a variety 
of memoranda focused on clarifying previously provided Patent Office 
guidance in light of new case law.82 
Measured by volume, the examining corps of the Patent Office 
arguably has the greatest amount of experience determining patent-
eligible subject matter.  Over 647,000 patent applications were filed 
with the Patent Office in fiscal year 2017.83  To be sure, not all of these 
applications require a detailed analysis of patent-eligible subject 
matter; in fact, not all of these applications ever reach an examiner’s 
desk.84  Regardless, patent examiners make the vast majority of patent-
eligible subject matter decisions each year. 
Although patent examiners may handle the greatest number of 
patent eligibility inquiries, their efforts are viewed as the least 
important as far as developing the jurisprudence of the doctrine.  First, 
rejections from patent examiners are secret until a patent issues.85  
Patent prosecution is an ex parte activity that is not laid open to the 
public before a patent is granted.86  If no patent ever issues, an 
examiner’s rejection may never be seen.87  Second, and related, an 
                                               
 80. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives:  Pressure to Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 394 (2011). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id.  See generally Memoranda to the Examining Corps, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/me 
moranda-examining-corps (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 83. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
FY17 27 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOF 
Y17PAR.pdf. 
 84. Patent applications can be abandoned at any time during the examination 
process.  See 711 Abandonment of Patent Application [R-07.2015], U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s711.html (last modified Jan. 
24, 2018, 5:19 PM) (detailing express and unintentional abandonment). 
 85. Gene Quinn, Understanding the Patent Process:  Rejections vs. Objections, IP 
WATCHDOG (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/02/patent-process-
rejections-vs-objections. 
 86. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS:  A CONCISE GUIDE § 5.1, at 32–33 
(2d ed. 2004).  Prior to 2000, everything was kept secret until a patent issued.  See id. 
 87. If the application is abandoned, the public may never learn about the 
prosecution history.  See id. at 34. 
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examiner’s rejection is often not the last word on the subject.  If the 
patent applicant believes the examiner erroneously rejected the 
application, the applicant can appeal the rejection to the PTAB.88  At 
this point, the rejection becomes (more) public, but the 
determination moves to a different institution.89  Third, patent 
examiners have limited discretion in making patent eligibility 
determinations.  To keep up with the quick evolution of the doctrine, 
the Patent Office issues numerous guidance documents to aid the 
examining corps in following the courts’ rulings when deciding patent-
eligible subject matter.90  Examiners are unlikely to deviate from the 
Patent Office’s guidance documents because it would be unnecessarily 
time-consuming and may have negative career repercussions.91  For 
these reasons, it is unlikely that the examining corps of the Patent Office 
has a significant effect on the law of patent-eligible subject matter. 
Although the examining corps may not have a significant effect as 
far as shaping the law, it does have a substantial, if silent, effect on 
innovation more generally.  Specifically, decisions of the examining 
corps may “nip” certain technologies in the bud by cutting off patent 
protection at a very early stage.  Individual companies may alter their 
spending decisions regarding research and development based on 
patent eligibility signals received from the Patent Office, which could 
have a direct impact on innovation.92  Additionally, negative 
determinations by the examining corps may have a broader effect on 
innovation by limiting the amount of disclosure, because the patent 
does not issue, and limiting the products that reach the market, because 
a company may decline to commercialize technology it cannot protect 
                                               
 88. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1) (2012) (authorizing PTAB review of “adverse decisions 
of examiners upon applications for patents”).  Some 10,000 of these ex parte appeals 
are resolved by the PTAB each year.  See John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron:  
The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1667 (2016). 
 89. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing the PTAB’s qualifications as a patent-
eligibility decider). 
 90. See, e.g., Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-
matter-eligibility (last visited May 20, 2019); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report 
of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop:  Addressing Patent Eligibility 
Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 561 (2018). 
 91. See Wasserman, supra note 80, at 397–98. 
 92. See, e.g., Amanda G. Ciccatelli, Revising Section 101 of the Patent Act:  What’s at 
Stake?, IP WATCHDOG (July 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/26/revisi 
ng-section-101-patent-act (noting that the patent eligibility standard may be having a 
chilling effect on patent rights, altering the incentives for private companies to invest 
in research); see also Coons, supra note 5. 
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via patent rights.  In keeping information and products from the public, 
future innovators may find fewer “shoulders of giants” to stand on.93 
2. Patent Office—PTAB 
More than any other institution, the PTAB has an opportunity to 
consider patent-eligible subject matter at multiple points of a patent’s 
life.  The PTAB hears appeals of rejections from the examining corps, 
which may include questions of patent-eligible subject matter.94  
Additionally, the PTAB may consider subject matter eligibility of issued 
patents via post-grant proceedings, specifically via post-grant review or 
covered business method review.95 
The PTAB is a group of administrative patent judges within the 
Patent Office.96  Per statute, administrative patent judges are “persons 
of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed 
by the Secretary [of Commerce], in consultation with the Director.”97  
Sitting in panels of at least three members,98 PTAB judges hear not just 
appeals from “adverse decisions of examiners,” but also 
reexaminations of issued patents, inter partes reviews, post-grant 
reviews, and covered business method reviews.99 
                                               
 93. This phrase is typically attributed to Isaac Newton:  “If I have seen farther, it is 
by standing on the shoulders of giants.”  Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke 
(Feb. 5, 1675), reprinted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS:  A 
SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 1 (1993).  The phrase more recently gained popularity in the 
innovation space.  See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:  
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991). 
 94. See Stephen Ball & Victor P. Lin, Using Ex Parte Patent Appeals to Advance 
Prosecution, LAW360 (Mar. 15, 2016, 10:45 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles 
/769482/using-ex-parte-patent-appeals-to-advance-prosecution.  The PTAB generally 
affirms the examiner’s rejections in cases involving patent-eligible subject matter.  See id. 
 95. See, e.g., Philip Swain, The Remarkable Effectiveness of Alice v. CLS Bank Challenges 
at the PTAB, FOLEY HOAG LLP:  PTAB BLOG (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.ptab-
blog.com/2015/10/23/the-remarkable-effectiveness-of-alice-v-cls-bank-challenges-at-the-ptab. 
 96. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).  The PTAB’s membership also includes the Patent 
Office Director and Deputy Director, as well as the Commissioners for Patents and for 
Trademarks.  See id. 
 97. See id.  The statutory criteria do not set a terribly high threshold.  Gene Quinn, 
the founder of IP Watchdog, studied the qualifications of the currently sitting PTAB 
administrative law judges and deemed them “shockingly inexperienced.”  See Gene 
Quinn, PTAB Judges Shockingly Inexperienced Compared to District Court Judges, IP 
WATCHDOG (Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/06/ptab-judges-
shockingly-inexperienced. 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). 
 99. § 6(b). 
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The PTAB, while deciding patent-eligible subject matter less 
frequently than the examining corps, still has ample opportunity to 
consider the issue.  For example, the PTAB regularly has over 12,000 
appeals pending annually of rejections from examiners.100  Of course, 
not all of these cases include patent-eligible subject matter rejections; 
however, because the PTAB can initiate review of subject matter 
eligibility sua sponte,101 it could potentially be considered in all of these 
cases.  Additionally, between 2012—when the proceedings became 
available—and October 2017, there were 529 covered business method 
review petitions and 82 post-grant review petitions filed at the PTAB.102  
While these post-grant proceedings do not necessarily include a patent-
eligibility challenge, it is a commonly raised ground of invalidation.  
Regardless of how the issue comes before it, the PTAB has been 
aggressively developing the contours of patent-eligible subject matter.103 
Unlike the examining corps at the Patent Office, the PTAB’s patent-
eligible subject matter decisions carry greater weight in the grand 
scheme of the doctrine because the PTAB’s influence is felt in multiple 
directions, both by the examining corps and by the courts.  The 
influence of the PTAB on the examining corps is hard to quantify 
because it is often of a more personal nature.  Specifically, a particular 
examiner’s understanding of patent-eligible subject matter is going to 
be directly influenced by his experiences from appeals of his previous 
cases before the PTAB.  The PTAB’s affirmance of the examiner’s 
rejections will likely encourage the examiner to continue to issue these 
rejections going forward.  If the PTAB sua sponte rejects a patent 
application under § 101 that the examiner had not rejected, the incentive 
to issue ineligible subject matter rejections in the future may be increased.  
On the other hand, the PTAB’s influence on the courts is much easier to 
                                               
 100. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., APPEAL & INTERFERENCE STATISTICS:  PATENT 
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 3 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/appeal_interference_statistics_2017oct.pdf.  Prior to fiscal year 2016, the 
PTAB had over 20,000 pending appeals annually.  See id. 
 101. See Kristen Osenga, The Problem with PTAB’s Power over Section 101, 17 CHI.-KENT 
J. OF INTELL. PROP. 405, 407 (2018). 
 102. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS:  IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_october_2017.
pdf.  The trend continued, with five CBM and four PGR petitions filed in October 
2017.  See id. at 5 (reporting fiscal year 2018 filings to date). 
 103. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent 
Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1577 (2016) (noting that, especially within the CBM 
context, “the PTAB has . . . been aggressive, particularly with respect to its 
interpretation of section 101”). 
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see because jurisprudence developed by the PTAB is often accepted 
wholesale by the courts.  Patent-eligible subject matter decisions are 
regularly affirmed by the Federal Circuit and often without opinion.104 
The PTAB’s patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence is also 
having a significant impact on innovation.  The PTAB has been called 
a “death squad”105 and a “killing field.”106  Although these monikers 
were earned for more than just the PTAB’s stance on patent-eligible 
subject matter, the problem is striking enough that multiple blogs are 
devoted, at least in part, to tracking the PTAB’s § 101 decisions.107  
While the Patent Office is the initial obstacle for patent applicants, 
particularly in the patent-eligible subject matter arena, the PTAB may 
be the final hurdle standing between an inventor and a patent.108  The 
PTAB also has significant power to end an issued patent’s life.109  
Because PTAB determinations have been, at best, uncertain, and at 
                                               
 104. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 794 fig.12. 
 105. See Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform 
Bill, BNA (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n17179879684 
(stating that on one side of the PTO “[y]ou have 7000 people giving birth to property 
rights,” but within the PTAB, there are as many as 300 administrative patent judges 
“acting as death squads, killing property rights”). 
 106. See, e.g., Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Patent Killing Fields of the PTAB:  
Erasing Federal District Court Verdicts on Patent Validity, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 14, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/14/patent-killing-fields-ptab-erasing-federal-
district-court-verdicts-patent-validity. 
 107. See, e.g., Bilski Blog, supra note 15; Post Grant Proceedings, BIRCH, STEWART, 
KOLASCH & BIRCH, LLP,  https://www.postgrantproceedings.com (last visited May 20, 
2019); Post-Grant, FISH & RICHARDSON LLP, http://fishpostgrant.com (last visited May 
20, 2019); PTAB Watch:  Section 101, MARSHALL, GERSTEIN, & BORUN LLP, 
https://www.ptabwatch.com/category/section-101 (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 108. See, e.g., Lauren Hockett & Christopher M. DiLeo, Analogous Analysis:  A Survey 
of Recent PTAB Decisions Establishing Subject Matter Patent Eligibility, KNOBBE MARTENS 
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/04/analogous-analysis-survey-
recent-ptab-decisions-establishing-subject-matter-patent (highlighting recent cases 
where the PTAB ruled that there was patent-eligible subject matter over an examiner’s 
rejection); Robert R. Sachs, The One Year Anniversary:  The Aftermath of #AliceStorm, 
BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2015), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2015/06/the-one-year-
anniversary-the-aftermath-of-alicestorm (providing data on patent-eligible subject 
matter rejections at the Patent Office).  This data has been regularly updated, and 
although there are slight signs that patent-eligible subject matter rejections are 
decreasing, they still remain an issue.  See, e.g., Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm Update for Q1 
2017, BILSKI BLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/04/alicestor 
m-update-for-q1-2017. 
 109. See, e.g., Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 10, at 955 (“The PTAB, however, 
continues aggressively to invalidate patents with § 101 rejections, as its ‘kill rate’ in the 
CBM program remains a remarkable 97.8%.”). 
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worst, anti-patent, these decisions are greatly influencing how 
corporations invest in innovative activities going forward.110 
Because the PTAB can decide patent-eligible subject matter both 
before a patent issues as well as after, the consequences to innovation 
are great.111  Just as with the examining corps, when the PTAB rejects 
an application, it can have the localized effect of altering that 
company’s future research and development trajectory, as well as the 
broader effect of keeping information and products from the public.  
When the PTAB invalidates an issued patent, it will likely have a 
localized effect on the particular patent owner, but because the patent 
(and often a product) are available to the public, the broader effect on 
innovation may be smaller in nature. 
3. Courts 
Patent-eligible subject matter decisions are also being made by 
courts at all levels.  Federal district courts decide the issue as a regular 
part of patent infringement lawsuits, with the alleged infringer 
claiming in defense the patent is invalid due to failure to meet § 101.112  
The Federal Circuit decides appeals from district court patent 
infringement lawsuits as well as appeals of various sorts from the 
PTAB.113  Finally, the Supreme Court hears appeals of both types of 
                                               
 110. Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 589–90; Kevin Madigan, An Ever-Weakening Patent 
System is Threatening the Future of American Innovation, CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. 
PROP. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2017/04/28/an-ever-weakening-patent-
system-is-threatening-the-future-of-american-innovation (citing Robert Sterne and Judge 
Michel at a conference where they indicated that investment in innovation is down, due 
in part to the PTAB and uncertainty in patent law). 
 111. See Osenga, supra note 101, at 406–08. 
 112. Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising 
under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).  This 
includes cases brought by patent owners, alleging infringement, as well as declaratory 
judgment actions filed by accused infringers, alleging the patent they are accused of 
infringing is either not infringed or is invalid. 
 113. See Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act:  A 
Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 389–91 (1984).  The Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction over three types of patent cases, granted by the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act (FCIA).  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1801 (2013).  These three patent case types are (1) federal 
district court cases “arising under” patent law, including patent infringement suits or 
suits seeking declaratory judgments of patent invalidity; (2) appeals from the Patent 
Office, including appeals of rejected patent applications and post-issuance review 
proceedings; and (3) appeals from International Trade Commission investigations 
regarding importation of products that allegedly infringe patents.  See id. 
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cases decided by the Federal Circuit, including patent infringement 
cases and appeals from the Patent Office. 
It is not easy to generally describe the characteristics of federal 
judges, particularly across the various levels from district court to 
Supreme Court.  Per the Constitution, federal judges are nominated 
by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.114  
However, the Constitution sets forth no further qualifications for 
judges.115  The Senate Judiciary Committee typically conducts 
confirmation hearings.116  Federal judges, once confirmed, are 
appointed for life.117  Because there are no formal criteria for being 
nominated and confirmed as a judge, and because judges’ life tenure 
means that the aggregate of currently sitting judges has been nominated 
and confirmed by a variety of political actors across time, the education 
and background of the judiciary as a whole is incredibly varied. 
Although the Supreme Court hears the least number of patent-
eligible subject matter cases, the topic has clearly caught the Court’s 
interest and imagination with four § 101 cases being decided over the 
span of four years, even with the Court’s limited docket.118  
Additionally, as the highest court, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on patent-eligible subject matter carries substantial weight with the 
lower courts and the Patent Office.  However, the ambiguous two-part 
test crafted by the Supreme Court has left “district courts and the 
Federal Circuit to fend for themselves.”119  With this much confusion 
being instilled by the Supreme Court, it makes sense to place the blame 
for patent eligibility chaos with that institution.120  To be fair, though, 
the cases the Supreme Court has to work with are not always the best,121 
and so some responsibility must also lie with the other courts. 
                                               
 114. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 115. See FAQs:  Federal Judges, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-federal-
judges (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Ciccatelli, supra note 92. 
 119. See Reinecke, supra note 13, at 8. 
 120. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Naked Emperors:  A Supreme Court Patent Tale, IP WATCHDOG 
(May 31, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/31/naked-emperors-a-
supreme-court-patent-tale. 
 121. See, e.g., Lauren Katzenellenbogen et al., Debate on In re Bilski, 7 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 260, 276 (2009) (noting that Bilski was a “bad case” for the Court to 
elucidate patent-eligible subject matter because “the Bilski invention would have been 
rejected for obviousness, if nothing else”). 
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The Federal Circuit has long been considered, and generally fancies 
itself, the “last word” on substantive patent law issues.122  Particularly 
before the Supreme Court took great interest in patent law, the Federal 
Circuit was essentially the Supreme Court of patents.123  Now, when the 
Supreme Court intervenes in patent law, it is typically because the Federal 
Circuit has run amok, generally by creating a bright-line test where the 
Supreme Court believes the analysis should be fuzzier.124  Rarely does the 
Supreme Court grant certiorari to affirm the Federal Circuit.125 
Because of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit regularly, and enthusiastically, 
exercises its ability and desire to develop doctrine in patent law, 
including subject matter eligibility.  For example, in 1998, the Federal 
Circuit crafted the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test for 
determining whether a potentially abstract idea was eligible for 
patenting.126  A decade later, the same court decided the test was not 
fully adequate for its purpose and imposed instead the “machine-or-
transformation” test, where a process invention was deemed eligible 
for patenting so long as either it was “tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus” or “transforms a particular article into a different state or 
thing.”127  Although the Supreme Court ultimately overruled the 
“machine-or-transformation” test as the sole test for eligibility, the 
Court acknowledged that the Federal Circuit’s test was “a useful and 
                                               
 122. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 665 (2009) (arguing 
that the Federal Circuit faces little competition from the PTO because, according to 
its own precedent, the PTO lacks substantive rulemaking power and should receive 
“weak” deference for its interpretations of the Patent Act). 
 123. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
387, 387 (referring to the Federal Circuit as “the de facto supreme court of patents”). 
 124. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 42–62 (2010) (discussing 
several cases, including Festo, KSR, eBay, and Bilski, that demonstrate the Supreme Court’s 
more holistic approach in softening the Federal Circuit’s formalistic rules). 
 125. This is not necessarily unique to the Federal Circuit, nor is it necessarily 
problematic.  See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit:  Comparative 
Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 558 (2010) (noting that 
from the October 1996 Term through the October 2008 Term, the Supreme Court 
decided thirteen patent cases in which it reversed the Federal Circuit in seven, vacated 
the judgment in four, and affirmed in two). 
 126. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding the “practical 
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation” is not an 
unpatentable abstract idea when it produces a “useful, concrete and tangible result”). 
 127. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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important clue, an investigative tool” for understanding patent-eligible 
subject matter.128  Most recently, the Federal Circuit issued a number 
of decisions attempting to flesh out the Supreme Court’s vague, two-
step test.129  Without question, the Federal Circuit has and will continue 
to have significant impact on patent-eligible subject matter. 
The district courts in general do not develop overarching patent-
eligible subject matter law.  District courts generally only consider 
subject matter eligibility in the context of patent litigation, while the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court currently decide patent-eligible 
subject matter on appeals from unsuccessful patent applicants from 
the Patent Office, as well as subject matter eligibility of issued patents 
from PTAB post-issuance proceedings and from patent infringement 
litigation.130  Because the Supreme Court especially (and to a lesser 
extent, the Federal Circuit) have not fully fleshed out the test for 
patent-eligible subject matter, many eligibility decisions at the district 
courts are being made via analogy to previously decided cases.  In this 
way, the district courts’ opinions, although not binding in other cases, 
are providing some detail to the contours of the doctrine. 
Like the decisions of the Patent Office, the courts’ opinions on 
patent-eligible subject matter are also having an effect on innovation.  
The Supreme Court has not determined any invention it has reviewed 
to be patent-eligible subject matter.131  The Federal Circuit has found 
patent-eligible subject matter in less than ten percent of its post-Alice 
cases on the issue.132  District courts also tend to invalidate patents due 
                                               
 128. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). 
 129. For a few notable examples on the computer and information technology side, 
see Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v. 
Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  On the biotechnology 
or pharmaceutical side, see Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals 
International, Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 130. Compare Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 412, 417 (D. 
Del. 2016) (patent infringement litigation), and Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. Cellzdirect, Inc., 
83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2015), vacated and remanded by Rapid Litig. Mgmt. 
Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed Cir. 2016) (patent infringement 
litigation), with Vanda Pharm., Inc., 887 F.3d at 1120 (patent infringement appeal), In 
re Verhoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (appeal of unsuccessful patent 
application), and Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (PTAB post-issuance proceeding). 
 131. See supra Section I.A. (discussing the Supreme Court’s patent-eligible subject 
matter jurisprudence). 
 132. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 768 (finding the Federal Circuit has 
a 92.3% invalidity rate). 
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to ineligible subject matter.133  To the extent these courts are 
invalidating issued patents or affirming rejections by the Patent Office, 
the courts at all levels are having an impact on the way companies 
decide to spend, or not spend, their innovation dollars. 
In some respects, the effect on innovation when the courts address 
subject matter eligibility may seem more significant if the outcome is 
invalidation of an issued patent.  After all, the company not only 
invested the original research and development resources to create the 
technology, but also the legal resources to patent the invention and 
likely additional research and development funds to commercialize 
and bring a product to market.  It may seem counterintuitive to say 
that innovation could be less affected in these cases, but if innovation 
is considered more broadly, there are benefits to allowing patents to 
issue and later have them declared invalid.  Specifically, the issuance 
of a patent and the potential that a company will have commercialized 
the technology described in the patent means that the information, 
and possibly a product, are available to the public. 
4. Other institutions 
Although it does not come into play as often, there is one additional 
body that can and does apply patent law in a quasi-judicial setting—the 
International Trade Commission (ITC).  Cases may be brought before 
the ITC to determine whether to bar importation of products alleged 
to infringe U.S. patents.134  Although it decides fewer cases and patent 
eligibility questions are less often raised, this institution has the 
opportunity to rule on § 101 questions.  However, because of its unique 
jurisdiction and relatively low number of cases, the ITC does not serve 
as a primary arbiter of patent-eligible subject matter, and its 
jurisprudence has little effect on other institutions.135 
                                               
 133. See Bijal Vakil et al., Months after Berkheimer and Aatrix:  Business as Usual, WHITE & CASE 
TECH. NEWSFLASH (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/months-
after-berkheimer-and-aatrix-business-usual (noting that between 2014 and 2017, district courts 
assessed patent-eligible subject matter in more than 400 opinions and in many cases found the 
patent invalid and since 2017, district courts are still finding a lack of patent-eligible subject 
matter at a similar rate). 
 134. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012) (authorizing the ITC to determine 
whether imported products infringe U.S. patents). 
 135. Many ITC cases are also accompanied by parallel district court proceedings.  
See Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 217 (2015) 
(“Patented import investigations before the ITC, for example, routinely affect parallel 
district court litigation.”). 
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5. When these institutions decide patent-eligible subject matter 
Patent-eligible subject matter can be assessed at a number of points 
during a patent’s life.  Before the patent is issued, the inquiry is made 
during patent prosecution regarding the patent eligibility of the 
invention described in the patent application.  After a patent is 
granted, patent-eligible subject matter is one ground on which to 
invalidate the issued patent, either in litigation or administratively.  
This subsection describes in more detail the various inflection points 
at which eligibility is assessed and when the three primary institutions 
described above come into play. 
Subject matter eligibility is first assessed during patent prosecution 
by a member of the examining corps at the Patent Office.136  If the 
patent examiner determines the application is lacking in patent-
eligible subject matter and is not persuaded by the applicant’s 
arguments to the contrary, the applicant may appeal the rejection to 
the PTAB that, among other things, reviews rejections issued by 
examiners.137  The PTAB can also consider whether a patent 
application is directed to patent-eligible subject matter sua sponte, if 
the patent application is before the body on appeal from a rejection 
under some other requirement of patentability, such as novelty or non-
obviousness.138  An applicant may appeal a negative determination of 
the PTAB to the Federal Circuit (and ultimately may seek certiorari at 
the Supreme Court);139 this is the posture of the Bilski v. Kappos case.140 
During an examination, if an examiner determines a patent 
application satisfies the requirements of patentability, the patent is 
                                               
 136. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n examiner should 
generally first satisfy herself that the application’s claims are drawn to patent-eligible 
subject matter.”), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 137. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 134(a).  The PTAB can affirm an examiner’s rejection 
or reverse and remand to the examining corps for additional proceedings.  See 37 
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1) (2011). 
 138. See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, PTAB Enters Sua Sponte Patent Eligibility Rejections, 
PHARMAPATENTS (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2018/02/06/ptab-
enters-sua-sponte-patent-eligibility-rejections (listing Ex Parte Patterson, No. 2016-001355 
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2017), as an example of such an action). 
 139. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145.  An unhappy applicant can also file a civil action in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, but this route is generally 
not taken in patent-eligible subject matter cases.  See § 145. 
 140. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599–600 (2010) (noting the procedural 
posture of the case from an examiner’s rejection to an appeal before the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (the predecessor to the PTAB), to the Federal 
Circuit (en banc), and ultimately to the Supreme Court). 
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then granted.141  However, patent-eligible subject matter may still be 
raised in attempts to invalidate an issued patent.  Challenges to issued 
patents may take the form of administrative review, via post-grant 
review proceedings brought before the PTAB.142  Alternatively, an 
alleged infringer may raise the defense of patent invalidity before a 
district court by claiming an issued patent is drawn to ineligible subject 
matter.143  Whether the initial decision on eligibility comes from the 
PTAB or a district court, the losing party may appeal the case to the 
Federal Circuit and ultimately the Supreme Court.144  The Alice case 
arose from a district court case where CLS Bank sought declaratory 
judgment that the patent at issue was invalid or not infringed.145 
As the above description demonstrates, the various institutions 
consider patent-eligible subject matter at a variety of sequential, and 
sometimes overlapping, points along a patent’s life.  Complicating 
matters further is that these paths or tracks are not exclusive of one 
another; for example, a patent may survive one challenge to its 
eligibility during patent examination and be subject to another 
challenge as an issued patent.  Alternatively, a patent may survive a 
validity challenge in the courts, but be found invalid for lack of patent-
eligible subject matter by the PTAB.146  Not only are patent-eligible 
                                               
 141. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 
2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-
patents (“If, on examination of the application, or at a later stage during the 
reconsideration of the application, the patent application is found to be allowable, a 
Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due will be sent to the applicant.”). 
 142. Patent-eligible subject matter may be raised as part of either a PGR or CBM.  
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2012); id. § 318 (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)). 
 143. See, e.g., Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, No. 14-cv-03228-EDL, 2017 WL 
6311568, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (noting that Cepheid responded to the charge 
of patent infringement by claiming the allegedly infringed patent was ineligible for 
protection); Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 412, 417 (D. 
Del. 2016) (same); Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 776 
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (noting that Cellzdirect sought summary judgment for patent 
invalidity due to ineligible subject matter), vacated, Rapid Lit. Mgmt. Ltd. v. 
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  An issued patent may also be 
reviewed by the ITC during infringement lawsuits brought before that body. 
 144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (providing Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from 
district court decisions arising under patent law, as well as over appeals from the PTAB). 
 145. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 214 (2014) (explaining that 
CLS Bank sought declaratory judgment, which the District Court granted, but the 
Federal Circuit reversed). 
 146. While not limited to § 101 challenges, Gene Quinn and his fellow authors 
provide interesting statistics.  168 of the 220 patents studied were found not invalid by 
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subject matter challenges not exclusive, they may even happen in 
parallel.147  For example, administrative invalidation proceedings are 
often brought at the PTAB simultaneously to the same allegation being 
made in court as a defense to patent infringement claims.148  Finally, 
eligibility decisions along different paths may have inconsistent 
preclusive or estoppel effects.149  The estoppel picture is even more 
convoluted, given that multiple different parties may have standing to 
challenge subject matter eligibility in the variety of institutions.  For 
example, while a justiciable case or controversy must exist for patent 
eligibility to be determined by a court, anyone other than the patentee is 
entitled to file an administrative invalidation action before the PTAB.150 
Regardless of which institution, be it the examining corps or the 
PTAB at the Patent Office, or one of the many levels of courts, and 
                                               
the courts, but were found invalid by the PTAB.  Fifty-eight of the patents invalidated 
by the PTAB were found invalid on the exact same grounds as those raised before the 
courts that had found them to be not invalid.  Gene Quinn et al., PTAB Facts:  An Ugly 
Picture of a Tribunal Run Amok, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 8, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/08/ptab-facts-ugly-picture-tribunal-run-amok. 
 147. See Anne Layne-Farrar, The Other Thirty Percent:  An Economic Assessment of 
Duplication in PTAB Proceedings and Patent Infringement Litigation 2 (June 28, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/The-
Other-30-Percent-An-Economic-Assessment-of-Duplication-in-PTAB-Proceedings-and-Pa 
tent-Infringement-Litigation.pdf.  Based on multiple studies, Layne-Farrar reports 86.7% 
of inter partes review (IPR) and CBM proceedings are also being litigated in district 
courts.  See id.  Of these, stays were granted in 70% of the cases, leaving 30% of 
proceedings to continue in parallel.  See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. For example, issued patents can be challenged before the PTAB or district 
courts.  For issues originally brought before the PTAB, estoppel depends on the type 
of proceeding.  If the patent-eligible subject matter challenge was raised via PGR, the 
party seeking PGR may not, if a final written decision is issued, request another 
proceeding before the Patent Office, district court, or ITC based on “any ground that 
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during the PGR.  See Jason Mock, 
Post-Grant Proceedings at the USPTO and the Rising Tide of Federal Circuit Appeals, 25 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 15, 21 (2015).  For a CBM on the other hand, subsequent proceedings at a 
district court are estopped only if the arguments were actually raised, while subsequent 
proceedings at the Patent Office are estopped under the same “raised or reasonably 
could have been raised” standard as PGR.  Id.; see also Steven Pollinger & Craig Tolliver, 
How Many Bites at the Apple After a PTAB Challenge?, LAW360 (July 25, 2017, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/945865. 
 150. There are some exclusions to who may file an administrative invalidation 
proceeding.  For example, 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 states that “[a] person who is not the 
owner of a patent may file” an inter partes review petition, unless (a) the petitioner has 
already filed a court action challenging validity; (b) the petition is filed more than a 
year after the petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement; or (c) the 
petitioner is estopped on some other ground.  37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2016). 
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regardless of where in a patent’s life subject matter eligibility is being 
considered, the test being imposed creates a high level of confusion and 
uncertainty.  The next section describes the mess this system is causing. 
C.   The Resulting Mess of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
As a consequence of these varied institutions developing patent-
eligible subject matter jurisprudence, in parallel by multiple actors and 
without much guidance from the top, the current status of subject 
matter eligibility is, as noted in the introduction, a real mess.151  There 
are at least three problems related to the multiple institutions that have 
contributed to the chaos.  These problems include:  (1) that the 
institutions have developed the doctrine without care; (2) that the 
institutions have declined to fully develop the doctrine; and (3) that 
the institutions, as well as the parties that appear before them, are 
misusing the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter.  Each of these 
problems is discussed below. 
First, various institutions are developing the doctrine of patent-
eligible subject matter without care or attention to the Constitution or 
existing patent law.  As noted above, the examining corps is generally 
simply following the doctrine developed by the PTAB and the courts, 
but these two institutions, and the courts especially, seem to have 
largely imagined the doctrine out of thin air, with little consideration 
given to the history of the doctrine and purpose of patent law.152  Both 
historically and in developing the 1952 Patent Act, the drafters 
repeatedly explained for what types of “inventions” or “discoveries” 
patents are available.153  The Constitution expressly states, and 
innumerable commentaries written since have discussed, the purpose 
for granting patents—to promote the useful arts and sciences—that 
should inform the types of inventions that are patent-eligible subject 
                                               
 151. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Lefstin et. al, supra note 90, at 554 (citing Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin 
& Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari, 
Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016), 2016 WL 1605520)). 
 153. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a), 101 (2012) (defining “invention” as “invention or 
discovery” and authorizing one who “invents or discovers” to apply for a patent); Act 
of February 21, 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323 (1793) (also referring to “invention or 
discovery” and “inventor or discoverer”); Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790) 
(authorizing a patent to any person who “invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device . . . if they shall deem the invention or 
discovery sufficiently useful and important”). 
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matter.154  Yet, these historical (or even contemporary) guideposts are 
not referenced by the case law generated by the PTAB and the courts, 
nor is there any nod to the purpose of patent law.  Rather, some of the 
recent patent-eligible subject matter cases are not about promoting the 
purpose of patent law at all.  Instead, they are a ham-handed attempt 
to solve an unrelated (and not necessarily real) problem related to 
patent licensing firms, pejoratively known as “patent trolls.”155 
Similarly, the current case law does not address the statutory 
structure of the provisions that accompany § 101.  The statute that 
gives rise to patent-eligible subject matter speaks directly to other 
requirements of patentability, stating “[w]hoever invents . . . any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”156  But even though the statute itself 
contemplates these other requirements, the two-part test’s search for 
an “inventive concept” or “something more” clearly imports one or 
more of a panoply of other patentability requirements, such as novelty 
or non-obviousness, that are provided in other provisions of the Patent 
Act.  By ignoring the history and purpose, as well as other functional 
provisions of the Patent Act, the various institutions have unnecessarily 
interjected confusion into the doctrine. 
Although the PTAB and courts of all levels are responsible for 
developing patent-eligible subject matter without regard for the 
purposes of patent law and the underlying statutory structure, the 
Supreme Court bears a special responsibility for the mess.  While the 
PTAB, the district courts, and even the Federal Circuit generally 
approach their decisions in a workmanlike fashion, the Supreme Court 
is supposed to consider the law more broadly, especially with respect 
to the Constitution.  And on other occasions, in addition to addressing 
                                               
 154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”).  See generally Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1076 (2014) (“[T]he USPTO only awards patents for inventions that 
add to the public storehouse of knowledge and support the patent system’s broader mission 
of promoting scientific progress and extending the frontiers of knowledge.”). 
 155. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 719 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, 
J., concurring) (extolling the virtues of patent-eligible subject matter as providing a 
“bulwark against vexatious infringement suits”); see also Robert P. Merges, The Trouble 
with Trolls:  Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 
1586 (2009) (“Some believe the troll label is a meaningless epithet, applied only to a 
plaintiff in a patent lawsuit with whom one has a legal conflict.”). 
 156. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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the specific patent law doctrine before it, the Supreme Court has often 
taken the opportunity to inject a constitutional bent to their analysis.  
For example, in a rather straightforward case to interpret and flesh out 
the law of non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Supreme Court 
waxed extensively about the constitutional underpinnings of the 
doctrine.157  Yet, in cases of patent-eligible subject matter that could 
have significant effects on innovation and beyond, the Court has not 
delved deeply into the purposes the law is meant to serve. 
Second, these institutions have declined to fully develop patent-
eligible subject matter.  For many years, rejections or invalidations 
under § 101 simply did not occur.  Prior to the Mayo decision, patent-
eligible subject matter was rarely considered an issue.158  If it was taught 
in a Patent Law course in law school, it generally did not even warrant 
a full class period.  In practice, it was considered an oddity—something 
rarely seen.159  Because it was not a common occurrence, there really 
was very little development of patent-eligible subject matter 
jurisprudence before 2010. 
However, after Mayo, the number of invalidations based on patent-
eligible subject matter “skyrocketed.”160  Once it became clear that 
patent eligibility was going to become a more important issue in patent 
law, the institutions deciding the issue did not take the opportunity to 
fill in what was a really large void, based on decades where subject 
matter eligibility was simply not considered.  The flood of cases that 
have followed each of the Supreme Court’s opinions did not answer 
the questions that were already at issue in these cases; they simply left 
a larger pool of questions to be answered.  Where is the line between 
discovery and invention?  Are algorithms all ineligible abstract ideas?  
What is the relationship between preemption and patent eligibility?  
What is the relationship between patent eligibility and the remaining 
                                               
 157. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 158. See Shai Jalfin, 6 Years Later:  The Effects of the Mayo Decision on Diagnostic Methods, 
IP WATCHDOG (July 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/19/6-years-
later-effects-mayo-decision-diagnostic-methods (differentiating Mayo and its aftermath 
from the precedent set in 1981 by Diamond v. Diehr and noting that in the six years 
since Mayo, method patents are frequently and successfully challenged). 
 159. The Author still remembers her shocked reaction to the Federal Circuit’s 
opinion in In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007), where the Federal 
Circuit held an invention to be ineligible subject matter under § 101.  Other 
commentators similarly look backwards on this case.  See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Remembering 
Nuijten and Comisky [sic] 5 Years Later, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/09/19/remembering-nuijten-and-comisky-5-years-later. 
 160. See Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 561. 
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requirements of patentability?  What exactly is encompassed by those 
judicially created exceptions:  laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas?  Moreover, since nearly all inventions are based in some 
respect on these judicially created exceptions, where is the line 
between those and patent-eligible advancements?161 
Part of the problem is that various courts have specifically declined 
to answer these questions, leaving the doctrine undeveloped.  The 
Supreme Court bears the greatest responsibility for passing the buck 
in these cases, as it has purposefully avoided answering the most basic 
of these questions.  For example, in the Alice case, the Court stated that 
it “need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ 
category in this case” because it was similar to the concept at issue in 
Bilski.162  Given the circumstances where the Court (and nearly 
everyone else) believes the doctrine to be incomprehensible and 
difficult to apply, it is unthinkable for the Court to dodge the question. 
Further adding to the confusion is the fact that other developed 
countries, which previously held stricter limitations on what types of 
inventions could be patented, are now significantly more generous on 
patent-eligible subject matter than the United States.163  Because of this, 
the various institutions that decide subject matter eligibility cannot draw 
on the precedent from these other countries as guidance.  With no 
guidance from the Supreme Court on the many open questions and very 
few avenues for seeking direction from elsewhere, the doctrine of 
patent-eligible subject matter remains woefully undeveloped. 
Third, the institutions that decide patent-eligible subject matter, as 
well as the parties that appear before these institutions, are taking 
advantage of the undeveloped law to misuse the doctrine.  This misuse 
of the law then leads to more confusion and continues to obfuscate, 
rather than illuminate the doctrine, as is so clearly needed.  The misuse 
of the law comes in two main activities:  claim-drafting gymnastics and 
using patent law as a sword. 
Claim-drafting gymnastics refers to efforts by patent attorneys to 
draft claims in patent applications that will either satisfy the two-part 
test for subject matter eligibility or, more preferable, avoid a subject 
                                               
 161. See id. 
 162. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014) (stating also that 
“[b]oth [Alice and Bilski] are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as [the Court 
has] used that term”). 
 163. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 10, at 957–58 (identifying inventions that 
were rejected in the United States as lacking patent-eligible subject matter but allowed 
in patent systems in China and the European Union). 
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matter eligibility analysis altogether.  Innovative firms are finding it 
more difficult to obtain patents under the current patent-eligible 
subject matter test, and thus claim drafting is becoming increasingly 
expensive as patent attorneys look for strategic and creative ways to 
cover the clients’ important inventions.164  But while creative claim 
drafting may make for happy clients, engaging in claim-drafting 
gymnastics to avoid eligibility determinations ends up harming patent 
law on two fronts.  First, the cleverly drafted claims may end up looking 
nothing like what is traditionally expected for inventions of that type, 
which defeats some of the notice functionality of patent claims.  
Second, by avoiding the inquiry into patent eligibility, these claims 
actually rob the doctrine of some of the nuanced analysis that is 
missing at present.  As long as the institutions refrain from providing 
actual clarity about what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter, the 
doctrine is going to be based on analogies to previously decided cases.  For 
inventions that a company thinks are innovative and important enough to 
spend additional resources to patent (using claim-drafting gymnastics), it 
would be more useful for innovation considered broadly for these 
institutions to actually reason, decide, and explain subject matter eligibility. 
Both institutions and parties are also using patent law, and 
particularly patent-eligible subject matter, as a sword.  The idea here is 
that rather than viewing patent law as a means to protect innovative 
technology and encourage inventive activity, patent law is being used 
to thwart companies engaging in these behaviors.  For example, firms 
that do not rely on patent protection and instead use other firms’ 
innovative technology (either lawfully under license or unlawfully as 
infringers) have been using patent eligible subject matter to invalidate 
patents covering that technology.165  The uncertainty of the doctrine 
makes it difficult for innovative firms to defend their issued patents, 
                                               
 164. See Gene Quinn, Why Does it Cost so Much to Prepare Patent Applications?, IP 
WATCHDOG (May 7, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/07/why-cost-so-
much-patent-application (noting part of the reason behind increased costs in patent 
claim drafting is because Supreme Court precedent regarding subject matter eligibility 
has resulted in patents becoming easier to challenge). 
 165. See, e.g., Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 
1037 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that patents directed to methods of distributing nitric 
oxide for pharmaceutical applications were not patentable because they described 
procedures not functionally related to the substrate on which the printed matter was 
applied); RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(finding a patent for coding and decoding image data an abstract idea rendering the 
patent ineligible); In re Brown, 645 F. App’x 1014, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) 
(holding that a method of cutting hair is not patent-eligible subject matter). 
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while the reasonable chance that a patent may be invalidated makes 
this option attractive to technology users.  Why take a license when 
there is a very good probability that the patent will be deemed invalid?  
Similarly, the institutions that decide patent-eligible subject matter are 
perversely using the doctrine as a trap door or an early exit, rather than a 
porous filter as it was intended.  That is, rather than serving as a low 
threshold or gateway to other patentability inquiries, such as novelty or 
non-obviousness, courts and the Patent Office are using patent-eligible 
subject matter early and often to avoid having to get to the more difficult and 
more resource intensive inquiries into the other patentability requirements. 
Because technology users are using the doctrine as a sword to have 
patents invalidated, it is common to see patent-eligible subject matter 
raised early in a lawsuit—as early as a motion to dismiss before 
discovery.166  The institutions, in return, are perfectly happy to end a 
patent lawsuit or invalidation proceeding, at this early stage.  Some 
commentators laud this use, stating that patent-eligible subject matter 
“serve[s] an important procedural function by providing a mechanism to 
quickly and cheaply knock out patents that are plainly invalid.”167  These 
frequent, and often very quick, invalidations of patents (or rejections of 
patent applications) at an early stage of inquiry is also contributing to 
the lack of development of the doctrine as well as the resulting chaos. 
The state of the patent-eligible subject matter doctrine is unlikely to 
course correct without intervention in some form because, first, it has 
been developed without regard to history, purpose, or other remaining 
provisions of the Patent Act and, second, because the institutions and 
parties responsible are misusing the doctrine in ways that sustain its 
underdeveloped nature.  Put simply, without fixing patent-eligible 
subject matter and the resulting chaos caused by the doctrine, 
innovative firms making research and development investment 
decisions may be unlikely to proceed in the shadow of this 
                                               
 166. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Patent 
eligibility has in many cases been resolved on motions to dismiss or summary judgment.  
Nothing in this decision should be viewed as casting doubt on the propriety of those 
cases.”); see also Ana Friedman, Section 101 Motions to Dismiss Still Alive in District Courts, IP 
WATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/14/section-101-
motions-dismiss (surveying recent district court decisions granting Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss under § 101). 
 167. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 777. 
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uncertainty.168  In this environment, is it any wonder the United States 
is failing on the innovation front?  Something has to change. 
II.    REFORM EFFORTS TO FIX PATENT-ELIGIBLE  
SUBJECT MATTER WILL NOT SUCCEED 
Rarely has any doctrine brought together diverse stakeholders in 
patent law to stand unified on any given issue.  Patent-eligible subject 
matter is one of those unusual times, as stakeholders of all stripes are 
arguing for reform.169  A number of high profile stakeholders, 
including the American Bar Association (ABA), the Intellectual 
Property Owners Association (IPO), and the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA), have offered various reform 
proposals for patent-eligible subject matter, as have other 
commentators including David Kappos, former director of the Patent 
Office.  While all of these groups have definitive views on how patent-
eligible subject matter should be fixed, very few have focused on 
whether their proposals will advance innovation in a meaningful way.  
More problematic is that, as noted above, successful reform requires 
consideration of what institution or institutions are best situated to 
develop and apply the doctrine.  While these various reform efforts 
have definite suggestions of how to improve patent-eligible subject 
matter, none has discussed which institution should do so. 
A.   American Bar Association 
The ABA, and specifically the Intellectual Property Law section 
(ABA-IPL), submitted a letter in response to the Patent Office’s 
                                               
 168. See Davis, supra note 4 (sharing David Kappos’ remarks at the American Bar 
Association Intellectual Property Law Conference, where Kappos stated that 
companies have halted investment into medical diagnostic research and development, 
and one company even removed “diagnostics” from its name to comfort investors). 
 169. To be fair, not everyone wants to “fix” patent-eligible subject matter.  For 
example, the Electronic Freedom Foundation, a notably anti-patent organization, 
indicated that no changes should be made to the patent-eligible subject matter regime, 
so as to eliminate vague or overbroad patents that hinder innovation.  See Patents:  The 
Patent System is Broken, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/patents 
(last visited May 20, 2019); see also Adi Kamdar et al., Defend Innovation:  How to Fix Our 
Broken Patent System, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 1 (2015), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/02/10/eff-defend-innovation.pdf.  Similarly, the 
Internet Association and the Computer and Communications Industry Association have 
advocated for maintaining the status quo.  See WILLIAM G. JENKS, COMMENTS OF THE 
INTERNET ASSOCIATION AND THE COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 
REGARDING THE LEGAL CONTOURS OF SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY (PART 2) 1, 2 (2017). 
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request for comments on patent-eligible subject matter.170  The ABA is 
“the largest voluntary professional association in the world” and claims 
the ABA-IPL section is “the largest intellectual property law association 
with approximately 20,000 members.”171  The section “advance[s] the 
development of intellectual property laws, and their fair and just 
administration” and claims to serve as “the forum for rich perspectives 
and balanced insight on the full spectrum of IP law.”172 
The ABA’s proposal begins from the premise that the Supreme 
Court overreaches with its two-step test and improperly eliminates 
patent protection for inventions that are practical applications of 
otherwise ineligible laws of nature or abstract ideas.173  The ABA’s 
proposal tries to rein in the Supreme Court, limiting ineligible subject 
matter to cases where the claims would preempt other parties’ uses of 
all practical applications of the particular law of nature or abstract 
idea.174  Although some court opinions on patent-eligible subject 
matter nod to preemption, the ABA’s proposal makes it explicit.  The 
ABA Resolution provides that a claim 
may be denied eligibility under this section 101 on the ground that 
the scope of the exclusive rights under such a claim would preempt 
the use by others of all practical applications of a law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea.  Patent eligibility . . . shall not be negated 
when a practical application of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, 
or abstract idea is the subject matter of the claims upon consideration 
of those claims as a whole, whereby each and every limitation of the 
claims shall be fully considered and none ignored.175 
The ABA’s proposal makes some positive changes to patent-eligible 
subject matter.  It would codify the long-standing judicially-created 
exceptions for laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.  
                                               
 170. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, ABA-IPL, to the Honorable 
Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and Dir. of the U.S. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/letter-
5.pdf (responding to Patent Office’s invitation for written comments listed at 81 Fed. 
Reg. 71485. (Oct. 17, 2016)). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See About Us, ABA-IPL, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_ 
property_law/about-us (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 173. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, supra note 170 (arguing that recent Supreme 
Court decisions have overturned the careful balance prior decisions struck “between 
preventing the patenting of pure laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas 
themselves, while authorizing the patenting of their application in particular fields”). 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
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It specifically requires analysis of the invention as a whole, rather than 
parsing and considering individual claim elements as either ineligible 
subject matter, conventional activities, or inventive concepts.176  
Finally, the ABA’s proposal moves the analysis away from importing 
questions of novelty and non-obviousness into patent-eligible subject 
matter, turning the inquiry on preemption instead.177  While each of 
these changes would represent a shift in the right direction, many of 
the same issues would still arise under the ABA’s proposed reforms, 
such as what exactly constitutes an abstract idea and when and how 
does estoppel apply.  Additionally, the ABA’s proposal introduces a 
new area of under-developed (or undeveloped) law that will simply 
continue the level of confusion about the doctrine:  what constitutes 
and how do we assess preemption?178 
B.   Intellectual Property Owners Association 
The IPO is “a trade association for owners of patents, trademarks, 
copyrights and trade secrets” in “all industries and all fields of 
technology.”179  Among their other priorities, IPO “advocates for 
effective and affordable IP ownership rights.”180  Not surprisingly, IPO 
is generally viewed as more pro-patent rights than the ABA-IPL, which 
holds itself out as balanced. 
The IPO’s proposal suggests adding additional paragraphs to § 101.  
These paragraphs include a new subsection (b) which states: “A 
claimed invention is ineligible . . . if and only if the claimed invention 
as a whole . . . exists in nature independently of and prior to any 
human activity, or exists solely in the human mind” and a new 
subsection (c) which exhorts that subject matter eligibility under § 101 
should be determined independent of other requirements of 
patentability in §§ 102, 103, and 112.181 
The IPO proposal has some features in common with the ABA 
proposal discussed above.  For example, it suggests that the courts 
should focus on the invention as a whole, rather than dissecting it into 
                                               
 176. See id. at 3. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. About IPO, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/abou 
t-ipo (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 180. Id. 
 181. INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT 
MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 1 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.ipo.org//wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-Proposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf. 
2019] INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR INNOVATION 1229 
 
the ineligible component (the abstract idea, law of nature, or natural 
phenomenon) and the rest of the claim.182  However, the IPO proposal 
does not hinge its analysis on preemption.  Instead, it tries to flesh out 
what exactly is problematic about laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas and uses that to frame ineligible subject matter.  This 
makes some sense because the concern about allowing patents on laws 
of nature or natural phenomena is that the invention exists without 
any sort of human intervention or activity—that is, it was not truly 
invented.  Similarly, with respect to abstract ideas, the concern is that 
a patent may cover something that is merely in the human mind—
difficult to demarcate and enforce.  The comments that accompany 
the IPO proposal highlight these provisions requiring some level of 
human effort and an aspect of physicality,183 thus addressing the 
concerns that underlie the judicially created exceptions.  While it is 
laudable to statutorily codify the judicial exceptions to patent-eligible 
subject matter, the IPO proposal does not fully ameliorate the 
confusion that abounds in this space. 
C.   American Intellectual Property Law Association 
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) is “a 
national bar association constituted primarily of lawyers in private and 
corporate practice, in government service, and in the academic 
community” covering all aspects of intellectual property.184  AIPLA is 
“an innovator, powerful advocate, and visible global leader in 
intellectual property law.”185  Because AIPLA represents both 
intellectual property owners and users,186 it is generally considered 
more IP-neutral than IPO, for example.  AIPLA suggests that the 
problem with patent-eligible subject matter determinations is with the 
“unnecessary and overreaching” judicially-created exceptions to the 
plain language of § 101.187 
                                               
 182. See id. 
 183. See Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 563. 
 184. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT (2017) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], 
https://www.aipla.org/docs/default-source/annual-reports/aipla_annualreport-2016_17.pdf. 
 185. Who We Are, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, https://www.aipla.org/about/about-us 
(last visited May 20, 2019). 
 186. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 184. 
 187. See Letter from Mark L. Whitaker, President, Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n to the Honorable 
Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intell. Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/comments_aipla_jan182017.pdf. 
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In May 2018, AIPLA and IPO united to issue a joint proposal on 
patent-eligible subject matter.188  The joint proposal retains the 
original text of § 101, indicates that the sole exceptions to patent-
eligible subject matter are if the invention exists in nature independent 
of human activity or is performed solely in the human mind, and then 
it tries to shift patent-eligible subject matter away from the other 
requirements of patentability, but noting that eligibility should not be 
based on other statutory sections (i.e., §§ 102, 103, and 112) or 
whether there is an inventive concept.189  For all of the reasons discussed 
above for the separate proposals, this joint proposal is also problematic. 
D.   Other Proposals 
Other commentators have suggested patent-eligible subject matter 
in the United States be harmonized with other major patent systems, 
such as the European Patent Convention.  The European Patent 
Convention includes a laundry list of patent eligible and ineligible 
inventions.190  While an enumerated list like this would offer a greater 
degree of certainty, it would require regular updating and may not 
adequately protect new and emerging technology.191  For example, 
Paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the European Patent Convention states 
that “(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
(b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing 
mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for 
computers; [and] (d) presentations of information” “shall not be 
regarded as inventions.”192  Paragraph 3, however, notes that 
“Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or 
activities referred to therein only to the extent to which a . . . patent 
application or . . . patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as 
such.”193  Similar proposals include a technological arts test, which 
would ask whether the claimed invention contributes to the 
                                               
 188. See Joint AIPLA-IPO Proposal on Patent Eligibility, AM. INTELL. PROP. L (last visited 
May 20, 2019). 
 189. See id. 
 190. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 254, http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/029F2D 
A107DD667FC125825F005311DA/$File/EPC_16th_edition_2016_en.pdf 
[hereinafter European Patent Convention]. 
 191. See, e.g., Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, supra note 11, at 2198–201. 
 192. See European Patent Convention, supra note 190, art. 52(2). 
 193. See id. art. 52(3). 
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technological arts, solves a technological problem, or otherwise falls 
within the technological arts.194 
Influential individuals in the patent field have also offered more 
radical suggestions to reform patent-eligible subject matter.  For 
example, David Kappos, former director of the Patent Office from 2009–
2013, has argued for a different type of reform, suggesting that § 101 
simply be abolished:  “It’s time to abolish Section 101, and the reason I 
say that is that Europe doesn’t have 101 and Asia doesn’t have 101 and 
they seem to be doing just fine in constraining patent-eligible subject 
matter.”195  Robert Sachs, original author of the Bilski Blog and long-
time Silicon Valley patent attorney, has similarly argued for abolishing 
§ 101, or in the alternative only considering patent-eligible subject 
matter after the other patentability requirements have been met.196 
Alternatively, Kappos and other intellectual property heavy-hitters 
have suggested Congress should step in to fix the “total chaos” caused 
by the Supreme Court’s patent-eligible subject matter cases.197  However, 
a congressional solution that enumerates patent-eligible (or patent-
ineligible) inventions is likely to be fraught with constant suggestions for 
amendments to add or subtract from the list,198 similar to the problem 
identified above with respect to the European Patent Convention’s list 
of non-inventions.  Although it would be difficult to design a legislative 
solution that appeases the variety of stakeholders involved, Kappos 
suggests that this would still be better than the current situation.199 
None of the proposals described above will solve the problem of 
patent-eligible subject matter.  Some suggestions fail to address already 
known areas of confusion in the existing law.  For example, some of 
the proposals leave the judicially created exceptions of abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, and natural phenomena intact or try to codify these 
                                               
 194. See Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 564–65. 
 195. Davis, supra note 7. 
 196. See Robert Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can save Section 101, BILSKI BLOG 
(Feb. 12, 2015), www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-can-
save-section-101.html.  Sachs also has advocated for a return to the useful, concrete, 
and tangible result test instituted by the Federal Circuit in the late 1990s.  Id. 
 197. See Davis, supra note 4.  Kappos argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions “lack 
clear guidelines,” necessitating a legislative solution.  Id.  Marian Underweiser, IBM 
Corp.’s senior counsel for intellectual property law, policy, and strategy, suggested that 
Congress may need to step in “[i]f we’ve decided the case law is not going anywhere and 
we can’t wait for the Supreme Court to fix it, yes, we’re going to have to go to 
Congress . . . [m]any of us have reached the conclusion that we have no choice.”  Id. 
 198. See id. (paraphrasing Robert Armitage, former Eli Lilly & Co. general counsel). 
 199. See id. 
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exceptions in other, but not more definitive, language, like “existing in 
nature” or existing “solely in the human mind.”  These proposals fail to 
flesh out questions about what these terms mean and where the line is, 
for example, between an ineligible abstract idea and an eligible 
invention that includes an abstract idea.  Other proposals introduce new 
areas of confusion, such as introducing the notion of “preemption.” 
All of these proposals are based on the notion that Congress must 
step in to fix patent-eligible subject matter.  Even if Congress had the 
appetite to do so, which is never a guarantee with all of its other 
concerns, none of these proposals enacted by Congress would yield a 
complete solution to the problem of patent-eligible subject matter.  A 
great number of questions would still exist after any of these proposals 
were adopted and none of the proposals suggest how these questions 
might be answered.  Without addressing this issue, and specifically which 
institution or institutions might be the correct one to fully develop the 
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter, no proposal is actually going 
to fix the mess.  This Article seeks to provide a complete answer. 
III.    A RADICAL SOLUTION:  TAKE PATENT ELIGIBLE 
SUBJECT MATTER AWAY FROM THE PATENT OFFICE 
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is clearly a mess.  
Multiple institutions make decisions about subject matter eligibility at 
a variety of different stages during a patent’s life.  The situation is 
complex, and unfortunately, rather than solving the problem, most of 
the proposed solutions to fix patent-eligible subject matter are simply 
restatements of the current test or, perhaps worse, add additional 
terms and concepts that no one understands.  To overcome what seems 
like an intractable problem, it is time to propose a radical solution.  
This Article proposes that patent-eligible subject matter 
determinations should not be undertaken by the Patent Office.200  To 
state this proposition more clearly, before a patent is issued, the 
question of patent-eligible subject matter should not be considered by 
the examiner or the PTAB—a patent should be granted so long as it 
meets the other requirements of patentability, including utility, 
novelty, non-obviousness, and adequate disclosure.  After a patent is 
issued, patent-eligible subject matter should not be the basis for any 
                                               
 200. For an entirely contrary viewpoint on this matter, see John M. Golden, 
Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2011) 
(arguing that patent-eligible subject matter decisions should be “primarily entrusted 
to the [Patent Office], rather than, as it is now, to the courts”). 
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post-grant review.  Instead, to the extent that patent-eligible subject 
matter is at issue, the question must be taken to the courts. 
Although this proposal may seem backwards, there are principles in 
both institutional design and administrative law that support it.  More 
importantly, there are a number of significant advantages that could 
be realized if the courts, and not the Patent Office, are deciding patent-
eligible subject matter.  Additionally, recent comments given by the 
Director Iancu,201 demonstrate that this proposal could be fairly easily 
implemented.  Each of these topics—institutional design bases, 
administrative law support, ancillary benefits, and operationalization 
of this proposal—are discussed below. 
A.   Institutional Design 
Institutional design, broadly, is a framework for understanding 
institutions and the roles they play.202  Like most aspects of the legal 
system, the institutional design surrounding patent-eligible subject 
matter arose in a rather ad hoc fashion, as the courts and the Patent 
Office took the lead in various respects with respect to the doctrine.203  
However, in focusing on successful reform, it makes sense to consider 
institutional design principles and whether the system is meeting its 
goals in the face of the variety of inputs.204  This section first discusses 
goals for the patent system in analyzing patent-eligible subject matter 
and then considers a variety of metrics to assess what institution or 
institutions would be best suited to achieve the goals described. 
1. Goals for a patent-eligible subject matter system 
To determine which institution or institutions are best suited for any 
particular purpose, it is important to specify some sort of baseline or 
                                               
 201. See infra notes 303–06 (detailing Director Iancu’s remarks at the Intellectual 
Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting). 
 202. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in THE THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 2 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996). 
 203. See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Defending Breakthrough Innovation:  The History and 
Future of State Patent Law, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2016); see also William Lucy, 
Persons in Law, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.  787, 788 (2009) (“In common law (and 
perhaps other) legal systems, features of institutional design are just as likely to have 
evolved piecemeal as to be the products of advanced planning.”). 
 204. See Laura K. Abel, The Role of Speech Regarding Constraints on Attorney Performance:  
An Institutional Design Analysis, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181, 185 (2012) (citing 
Goodin, supra note 202). 
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goal.205  Because the patent system exists to promote the “Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts,”206 i.e., promote innovation, the normative 
goal for the patent system, and particularly patent eligibility, must be 
innovation.207  Or, more specific to this Article, what institution can 
best address patent-eligible subject matter to promote or increase 
innovation?  Technological innovation, the type of innovation at the 
heart of the patent system involves the invention of a new product or 
process, as well as “putting the invention into productive use.”208  It is 
this second step, putting the invention to productive use, which leads 
to societally desired long-term improvements in growth and well-being 
across a wide range of metrics, including economic growth.209  
Innovation policy would involve the preferencing of systems and rules 
that encourage the development and deployment of technological 
inventions to the benefit of society.210 
While defining innovation may be complicated, a more difficult 
question may be how we measure innovation.  Measuring long-term 
improvements in growth and well-being is not an easy task.  Even 
measuring the amount of development and deployment of 
technological inventions is tricky, especially because innovation is 
often a time-consuming endeavor and because inventions often build 
upon earlier inventions that were helpful to advance the technology 
but may not have been readily or successfully deployed.211  In the 
absence of a concrete measure of innovation, another angle would be 
to look at what types of things help or hinder innovation.  For example, 
if patents are intended to incentivize innovation, patent policy must 
                                               
 205. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48–50 (1991) (arguing that institutional analysis must start 
from a normative baseline). 
 206. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 207. See I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam) (“[T]he constitutional grant of authority ‘[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts’ . . . ‘is both a grant of power and a limitation’ . . . Section 101’s 
vital role . . . is to insure that patent protection promotes, rather than impedes, 
scientific progress and technological innovation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 208. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy:  A Structural 
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008). 
 209. See id. (“A major goal of any society should be to increase people’s well-being 
or welfare, broadly defined.”). 
 210. See id. at 9. 
 211. See id. at 10–11. 
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pay attention to the “ever-shifting reality of the scientific and technical 
challenges faced by innovators.”212 
It would be ideal if there were concrete, agreed-upon goals by which to 
assess institutional designs for patent-eligible subject matter.  Given the 
complexities of patent law generally, and the convolution of the various 
institutions that administer patent law, it is surprising that aspects of 
institutional design are not more frequently discussed by patent law 
scholars.  The institutional design of the Federal Circuit has been 
examined,213 as has the deference between the Patent Office and the Federal 
Circuit.214  However, the literature does not fully explore the relationship 
between the various institutions concerning broader legal issues.215 
The goals for “fixing” patent-eligible subject matter have, 
unfortunately, not been clearly elucidated.  Certainly, having a test that 
is not regularly denounced for its difficulty to apply would be a good 
starting point, but does that necessarily incentivize innovation?  The 
statutory categories—processes, machines, manufactures, and 
compositions of matter—are probably helpful because they set 
patentable inventions apart from creations that do not qualify for 
patents, such as copyrighted works or trademarks.  The judicially 
created exceptions—law of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
idea—are also probably useful, because patents on gravity, elm trees, 
or long division would not enhance innovation. 
What else can be said about patent-eligible subject matter as far as it 
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts?  This Article 
suggests three primary goals to promote innovation, each focusing on 
different stakeholders within the patent ecosystem.  First, innovative 
companies need to be able to obtain reliable and effective patent rights 
                                               
 212. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1046 (2003). 
 213. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Continuing Experiment 
in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 797–98 (2004) (noting the tension 
between having a specialized appellate bench and the degree of fact-finding deference 
owed in each particular case); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding?  An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114–
17 (2004) (concluding that the Federal Circuit has successfully manifested Congress’s 
desire for a central manager for patent law). 
 214. See generally Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:  Chevron 
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1959–60 (2013). 
 215. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 80, at 385 (noting that “the existing literature 
does not fully explore how the institutional design of the [Patent Office] and its 
relationship with the Federal Circuit affect the Agency’s official positions on 
substantive law”). 
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for their inventions.  Second, the public needs to have access to the 
goods made possible when these companies commercialize these 
inventions.  Third, future innovators need to have access to 
technological information made public through available goods and 
patent disclosures.  With these three goals in mind, we can start to 
consider what institution or institutions may be best to assess patent-
eligible subject matter. 
2.  Metrics for assessing institutional design 
To promote innovation, the baseline goals of a system for patent-
eligible subject matter may include (1) providing reliable and effective 
patent rights, (2) encouraging commercialization of inventions, and 
(3) fostering disclosure of technological information via the market 
and the patent system.  Institutional design would thus consider which 
institution or institutions would make it more likely that these goals 
are achieved.  Although there are a number of metrics that could be 
used to assess an institution’s abilities, this Article focuses on four 
particular metrics:  competencies, priorities, redundancies, and trust 
and respect.  Based on these metrics, a strong case emerges that, to 
promote the goals associated with innovation as described above, 
patent-eligible subject matter decisions are best left to the courts. 
a. Competencies 
To determine which institutions are best suited for any given task, it 
is important to look at each institution’s strengths, as well as the tasks 
we are seeking it to perform.  The unique strength of the Patent Office 
is technological knowledge.  As noted above, the examining corps is 
composed of scientists and engineers trained in patent law.216  The 
PTAB is comprised of lawyers, many of whom were also trained in 
science or engineering.217  PTAB judges are also generally considered 
experts in patent law.218  Structural features of the Patent Office reflect 
and emphasize the technological focus of that institution, including 
the Patent Office’s organization by technology type (technical art 
units),219 an elaborate classification scheme, which sorts documents by 
                                               
 216. See ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS, supra note 77. 
 217. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of 
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . .”). 
 218. See Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 842 (2016). 
 219. See Patent Technology Centers Management, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technology-centers-
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technical field,220 and the requirement of technical training for 
attorneys who are admitted to the Patent Bar, allowing them to 
correspond with the Patent Office.221 
On the other hand, the courts are generally staffed by lawyers 
trained in law, most of whom are not trained in science or engineering.  
Some judges, particularly those at the Federal Circuit and district 
courts that see a lot of patent cases, purposefully hire clerks that are 
trained in science or engineering.  Additionally, judges may have access 
to special masters or other expert sources with scientific backgrounds.  
While not scientists, judges are, however, experts in law and policy. 
Given these areas of strength, it then becomes a question of what we 
are asking that institution to do.  Many inquiries in patent law are 
driven by questions of fact or are mixed questions of law and fact.  
Factual issues in patent law are where the strengths of the Patent Office 
are critical.  Take, for example, the fact question of novelty.222  
Determining whether a claimed invention is the same as a technology 
described in the prior art, such as in a previously published journal 
article, often requires an understanding of the technology involved.  
Questions of law based on underlying facts also tend to require 
technological inquiries.223 
                                               
management (last visited May 20, 2019) (outlining the organizational structure of 
USPTO’s patent management system). 
 220. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM (USPC) I-1 (2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resour 
ces/classification/overview.pdf (“The USPC is a system for organizing all U.S. patent 
documents and many other technical documents into relatively small collections based 
on common subject matter.”). 
 221. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO 
THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/OED_GRB.pdf (“An applicant applying for the examination must 
demonstrate . . . that he or she possesses the scientific and technical training necessary 
to provide valuable service to patent applicants.”). 
 222. See, e.g., Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit:  
Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 361–62 app. A (2002) (citing Glaverbel 
Societé Anonymé & Fosbel, Inc. v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1554 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)) (“Whether an invention meets the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 is a question of fact reviewed for clear error or substantial evidence.”). 
 223. For example, consider the inquiry into non-obviousness.  See id. at 363–64 
(highlighting the fact questions that underlie the determination of non-obviousness). 
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Patent-eligible subject matter was long thought to be a pure question 
of law,224 which in part led to its rather enthusiastic use for invalidating 
patents.225  As a question of law, this task may fall more squarely in the 
competencies of the courts than the Patent Office.  Recently, however, 
the Federal Circuit changed its stance on this long-held understanding 
that patent-eligible subject matter is a pure question of law.  In 
Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,226 decided on February 8, 2018, the court 
acknowledged that patent eligibility “is a question of law which may 
contain disputes over underlying facts.”227  However, the underlying 
fact questions are not the essence of the patent-eligible subject matter 
inquiry.  Instead, these fact questions go to the second prong of the 
Alice test:  “Whether something is well-understood, routine, and 
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual 
determination.”228  While some commentators herald this opinion as 
making patent invalidation, especially at the early stage of litigation, 
more difficult,229 it does not change the fact that many patent-eligible 
subject matter decisions are generally driven by law, policy and 
preference choices, not the factual inquiry regarding the presence of 
routine or conventional technology. 
Even with the recent introduction (or acknowledgement, at least) of 
a factual component of patent-eligible subject matter inquiries, it is 
true that not all facts are created equal.  Some facts are “adjudicative 
facts” in that they “help the decision-maker establish what happened 
at a particular time and place.”230  Other facts are “legislative facts” that 
“help a decision-maker decide questions of law and policy.”231  Most 
questions related to patentability are adjudicative facts—facts where 
                                               
 224. See id. at 361 app. A (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc. 172 F.3d 1352, 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[S]tatutory subject matter under [§ 101] is a question of law 
reviewed de novo.”). 
 225. See supra Section I.C. 
 226. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 227. See id. at 1368. 
 228. See id. at 1369. 
 229. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Berkheimer v. HP:  Federal Circuit Says Patent Eligibility a Factual 
Determination Inappropriate for Summary Judgment, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 16, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/16/berkheimer-hp-eligibility-factual-determination 
(“Berkheimer is also equally important . . . because it stands for the proposition that 
questions of fact can and do underline patent eligibility determinations.  This is 
important . . . because it will make summary judgment more difficult for infringers . . . .”). 
 230. Golden, supra note 200, at 1055 (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 3.6.1 (3d ed. 1999)). 
 231. Id. 
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the law will depend on questions of science or technology.232  Patent-
eligible subject matter, on the other hand, is nearly all legislative fact.233  
At bottom, the real questions and open issues behind patent-eligible 
subject matter are questions of law and policy—what exactly is meant 
by the statutory categories, the judicially-created exceptions, and 
where the lines are drawn between them.  While inquiries regarding 
science and technology are squarely within the wheelhouse of the 
Patent Office, matters of law and policy remain the forte of the courts. 
The questions that exist about patent-eligible subject matter are 
generally related to two themes—what exactly are the judicially created 
exceptions and what is the difference between an application of these 
exceptions and a claim directed to the exception itself.  The first 
question would seem to be a matter of law—and specifically, statutory 
interpretation, a particular competency for courts.  Moreover, the 
courts are the instigators of the exceptions in the first place; the courts 
are the correct institution to tell us what they meant.  The second 
question would seem to be a matter of law and policy—how to best 
interpret § 101 to effectuate the constitutional requirement of 
promoting innovation.  Courts regularly have to interpret statutes to 
satisfy constitutional provisions.  As noted above, this requires that 
patent-eligible subject matter focus on effective and reliable patent 
rights, commercialization of technology, and disclosure in the form of 
goods and patent documents.  None of these issues is squarely based in 
technology; rather, they are more general questions of law and policy. 
While questions of law are best resolved by courts, to the extent that 
patent-eligible subject matter is also a matter of policy, there can still 
be disagreement over which institution is best suited for addressing the 
question.  Some scholars have argued that the Patent Office may have 
particular policy-making strengths over the courts.  For example, Arti 
Rai points out that the Patent Office, in regulating ex ante, may be 
better able to keep a rein on expanding patent rights.234  This begs the 
question, in the instant case, of whether reining in expanded patent 
rights using patent-eligible subject matter promotes innovation.  Given 
                                               
 232. See id. at 1055–56 (“Inquiries into novelty and nonobviousness typically require 
painstaking review of prior-art materials that are specifically related to the claimed invention.”). 
 233. See id. at 1058 (“[S]ubject-matter eligibility does not require anything 
distinctive or specific to the claimed invention.  Instead, subject-matter eligibility 
requires that the claimed invention belong to one or more broadly drawn categories 
of things deemed potentially patentable.”). 
 234. See Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch:  Ex Ante Foundations for 
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1264–65 (2012). 
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the current state of affairs, it seems the opposite is true, as the 
overzealous use of patent-eligible subject matter to quash patent 
applications and issued patents is harming innovation.  Jonathan 
Masur argues that the Patent Office has expertise and institutional 
resources that the federal courts simply do not have, including 
“enormous quantities of useful information” that the Patent Office 
produces.235  As interesting and wide-ranging as this data is, it is not 
clear that it is directly related to innovation policy.  In fact, although 
the Patent Office has, as Masur points out, lots of data, unlike other 
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, the Patent Office does not 
have a rich tradition of economic analysis.236  This has been changing, 
however, and the Office of the Chief Economist at the Patent Office 
has been doing much good work.237  It is not clear, however, that this 
data is designed to uncover policy regarding innovation with respect 
to patent eligibility.  Finally, Michael Burstein argues that greater 
policy decision making by the Patent Office could avoid piecemeal 
decision-making.238  In the current instance, however, patent-eligible 
subject matter as done by the Patent Office is occurring piecemeal and 
is adding to the bulk of confusion surrounding the doctrine.  Thus, 
although it seems to make sense to argue that this criterion weighs in 
favor of the Patent Office having the most apt competency, the facts 
may not be true in application. 
Further, the open issues of patent-eligible subject matter are mixed 
questions of law and policy.  While the modern administrative state 
contemplates specifically that policymaking should be placed in the hands 
of agencies,239 the open questions of law compel the decision to be 
removed from agency determinations and left instead with the institutions 
that are best suited to interpret the law.  As discussed below, the unlimited 
breadth of the statute and the fact that there has been no additional 
guidance about how the law should be understood or interpreted actually 
weighs against giving the issue to an agency to flesh out. 
                                               
 235. Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 275, 279 
(Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2011). 
 236. See Rai, supra note 212, at 1126. 
 237. A variety of publications and datasets can be found on the Patent Office’s website on 
the Office of the Chief Economist’s page.  See Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-
international-affairs/office-chief-economist (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 238. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1748 (2011). 
 239. See Rai, supra note 212, at 1131. 
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Even assuming arguendo that patent-eligible subject matter is an issue 
of science and technology instead of law and policy, it is not clear that 
the Patent Office is the best institution to develop its contours.  The 
argument that patent examiners are better suited because of their 
technical expertise may also be an overstatement.  First, there is no 
requirement that patent examiners remain current in their area of 
technology.  Second, even if an examiner has an advanced degree in a 
particular field, that examiner will be examining patent applications 
that fall outside of his area of expertise.  The more education an 
examiner has, the more likely it is that he will handle patent 
applications outside of his strengths, albeit in the same technology 
field; perhaps the less-educated, newest examiners are the best 
technically suited to examine patent applications, but does that make 
them good at law and policy?  Furthermore, particularly for the types 
of patent applications that fall within the abstract idea section, these 
are often business methods; but business methods is not a college 
degree.  The examiners that work in any given technology area have 
varied backgrounds that may defeat the very idea of technical expertise 
that would make the Patent Office the best arbiter of technology 
questions.  No matter what their scientific expertise, there is no 
argument that patent examiners would be the best institution to flesh 
out open areas of law and policy. 
One solution, that would seem to get “the best of both worlds,” 
would be to remove the patent examining corps and leave 
development of patent-eligible subject matter to the PTAB.  After all, 
as a body of administrative law judges with training in both science and 
engineering, as well as law, perhaps they would be best suited to work 
with both the technological and legal nuances required to develop the 
doctrine.  However, one recent study by Gene Quinn indicates that 
administrative patent judges may not be terribly experienced in either 
realm.  For example, the median number of years of experience at the 
time of appointment for a PTAB judge was eleven years of experience, 
with an average of 13.04 years.240  This pales in comparison to federal 
district court judges (selected from primary patent courts in the 
United States), who had a median of twenty-three years of experience, 
and average of 23.38 years of experience, before being appointed to 
the bench.241  More striking, however, than the difference in the 
median and average years of experience is just how little experience 
                                               
 240. See Quinn, supra note 97. 
 241. See id. 
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some of the PTAB judges had; some were appointed to the PTAB with 
less than five years of experience.242  Given the typical time to make 
partner in a law firm is ten years, nearly half of PTAB judges were 
appointed while they were at best senior associates.243  As Quinn notes, 
“[t]he experience level of the PTAB as a whole is shockingly low in 
comparison to federal district court judges, and the Secretary of 
Commerce is appointing individuals who could never win 
confirmation in the United States Senate to be a district court judge” 
and yet gives these administrative law judges extraordinary power.244  
Because PTAB judges are potentially not experts in science and 
technology and are also not experts in law or policy, it would seem they 
would be the least well-suited to develop the doctrine of patent-eligible 
subject matter, whether that issue is classified as a technical issue or, 
more correctly, as a matter of law and policy. 
For these reasons, this Article suggests that the courts may be the 
more competent institution to carry out the task of fixing patent-
eligible subject matter.  This Article is not the first to suggest that the 
Federal Circuit is best suited to handle patent policy.245  After all, 
interpreting law to suit constitutional requirements is what courts do 
every day.  Additionally, the courts are responsible for crafting the 
judicially created exceptions, as well as the mess that resulted from the 
incomplete development of the law surrounding these exceptions.  
                                               
 242. See id.  Quinn found 12.64% of PTAB judges were appointed five years or less 
removed from graduating law school, 7.47% had less than four years of experience, 
and some were appointed with as little as two years of experience.  See id. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id.  The Chief Judge of the PTAB, David Ruschke, responded to Quinn’s study: 
The USPTO has full confidence in the legal and technical capabilities of each 
Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) appointed to the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB).  All of our judges have specialized technical degrees combined 
with extensive legal and technical experience, including that gained over 
many years in private practice, industry, and/or government.  The judges 
clearly possess the required professional and technical qualifications needed 
to conduct Board proceedings of any type and to issue decisions addressing all 
issues that come before the Board. 
See Gene Quinn, PTAB Chief Judge Defends APJs as Having Extensive Legal Experience, IP 
WATCHDOG (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/08/ptab-chief-
judge-defends.  Quinn renews and clarifies his study in response to this quote in the same 
post, arguing that even giving these administrative law judges credit for their time as 
examiners at the Patent Office or other government service, they still lack any sort of 
legal experience as would be expected by a person in charge of adjudication.  See id. 
 245. See Burstein, supra note 238, at 1757 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has become the 
most important expositor of the substantive law of patents in the United States.”). 
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Even if the courts had not created these exceptions, the open issues for 
patent-eligible subject matter are questions of law and policy, not science 
or technology.  Understanding and interpreting law, and the related 
policy issues, is what courts were designed to do.  In addition to fitting 
squarely within courts’ areas of expertise, there are ancillary benefits to 
lodging these decisions with the courts; these benefits are described below. 
There are, of course, objections to the courts deciding patent-
eligible subject matter beyond the question of their specific 
competencies.  Specifically, concerns have been raised about courts’ 
abilities to address broad issues of innovation policy, timeliness of 
decision-making, lack of flexibility, and application of stare decisis 
yielding a “substantially incoherent body of precedent.”246  However, 
courts are addressing patent law issues germane to innovation policy 
all the time.  The backlog of the Patent Office, both in terms of the 
examining corps and the PTAB, means that the Patent Office is rarely 
much quicker than the courts.  And finally, the courts have exhibited 
as much flexibility and incoherence as the Patent Office on the issue 
thus far, giving neither institution the edge as far as patent-eligible 
subject matter doctrine.  These concerns, to the extent valid, do not 
override the benefits of having courts define the outstanding legal contours 
of patent-eligible subject matter.  As far as competencies, the courts seem 
to be in a better position to determine patent-eligible subject matter. 
b. Priorities 
Another facet to be considered when looking at institutional design 
is priorities of each institution.  In particular, it should be asked which 
institution’s priorities are most in line with the task at hand.  The task, 
of course, is developing patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence to 
best promote innovation (or the progress of science and technology).  
The priorities of the Patent Office and the courts are, not surprisingly, 
different from each other. 
The Patent Office, according to its mission statement, is to issue valid 
patents.  Specifically, the Patent Office strives to: 
Foster[] innovation, competitiveness and economic growth, 
domestically and abroad by delivering high quality and timely 
examination of patent . . . applications, guiding domestic and 
international intellectual property policy, and delivering intellectual 
                                               
 246. These four points come from John Golden’s article.  See Golden, supra note 
200, at 1075. 
1244 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1191 
 
property information and education worldwide, with a highly-
skilled, diverse workforce.247 
Although the Patent Office mission statement pays lip service to 
innovation and policy—and even includes these terms in its mission 
statement—its key priority is examining patent applications and 
issuing patents.  This is evidenced by the metrics the Patent Office uses 
to illustrate its annual activities—including number of applications 
examined, number of patents issued, number of employees engaged 
in such activities, and so on.  For many years, patent examiners worked 
on a system of points based on “counts” earned for issuing office 
actions and disposing of patent applications.248  Examiners had to earn 
a certain number of counts and bonus awards were based on counts as 
well.249  The count system for measuring patent examiner performance 
has been modified in the last decade, but the focus is still on patent 
examiners processing patent applications.250  While certain offices 
within the Patent Office are engaged in policy activities, it is not the 
bread and butter of the agency. 
Courts, on the other hand, are focused on settling disputes under 
law and clearing their dockets.  In doing so, courts strive to preserve 
“core values” such as the rule of law, which involves ensuring 
predictability, coherence, and transparency of process, as well as 
judicial independence and adaptability to changing national and local 
needs.251  Courts have long interpreted law based on policy through 
case decisions and, in fact, patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence 
has much of its background from the courts, including the 
development of the judicially created exceptions. 
There are two reasons why the priorities of the courts may cut against 
choosing courts as the best institution for developing patent-eligible 
                                               
 247. See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., USPTO 2014–2018 STRATEGIC PLAN 2 
(2014), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_2014-2018_ 
Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
 248. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1549–50 (2009). 
 249. See id. 
 250. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Force Proposes Significant 
Changes to Examiner Count System (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/news-updates/uspto-joint-labor-management-task-force-proposes-significant-
changes-examine-0 (noting that a key goal of the 2009 modifications to the count 
system was to “[e]ncourage examiners to identify allowable subject matter earlier in 
the examination process”). 
 251. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 (2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/strategic-plan-federal-judiciary. 
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subject matter—case selection and coherency.  Case selection is often 
deemed a limitation for courts in clarifying law.  Specifically, courts 
may only shape law and policy through the cases that are brought 
before them, and these cases may not present a complete picture of 
the issues that need to be decided.252  Further, the perspectives heard 
by the courts are generally only the litigating parties, who do not have 
the incentives to present all relevant arguments.253  Finally, the court 
system does not have the resources to fully evaluate complex economic 
policy, which is critical for promoting innovation.254  However, these 
same criticisms are true of the Patent Office as well, because most of 
the effective patent-eligible subject matter doctrine created via PTAB 
cases suffers from similar selection problems. 
As law and policy develops, courts, at least occasionally, also suffer 
from lack of coherency.  In order for patent-eligible subject matter to 
develop into a pro-innovation doctrine, there must be some certainty 
and predictability provided by its application.  In this case, it is actually 
a positive that the courts do focus on rule of law.  Consistent, 
transparent inquiries into subject matter eligibility would provide a 
valuable tool in developing the doctrine in a meaningful way.255  Courts 
are actually better suited to developing law policy in this respect than 
the Patent Office, because stare decisis is not in play and many Patent 
Office decisions (particularly those of the Patent Office examining 
corps) are not transparent. 
Ultimately, what is required to achieve reliable and effective patent 
rights, encourage commercialization, and foster disclosure of 
technological information is for some institution to develop a common 
law of subject matter eligibility.  After all, if Congress does not amend 
the statute, or even if it does, there will remain many open areas within 
the law that will need to be answered via analogy to the technology 
described in other patent applications and patents.  Deciding these cases 
                                               
 252. See Rai, supra note 212, at 1122–23. 
 253. See id. at 1123. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Chief Judge Leonard Stark of the District of Delaware recently had a “Section 
101 Day,” where he rapidly addressed patent-eligible subject matter claims in seven cases 
in one day.  See Matthew Bultman, ‘Section 101 Day’ Yields Quick Ruling on Patent Eligibility, 
LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1133434.  Judge 
Stark arrived at the idea because he “had a lot of Section 101 motions” on his docket and 
he thought “perhaps there may be some efficiencies to be gained by doing something 
like this experiment”  See id.  Although it does not necessarily evidence a careful and 
consistent inquiry by a court, it certainly demonstrates that courts are willing to 
experiment to arrive at a better way to deal with complicated doctrine. 
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in a way that preserves and enhances the “core values” of the rule of law 
by developing a predictable and coherent jurisprudence of patent-
eligible subject matter is clearly within the priorities of the courts. 
c. Redundancy 
Another facet to consider when selecting the best institution for a 
task is redundancy.  Redundancies are not themselves a problem; too 
much redundancy is.  When patent-eligible subject matter decisions 
begin in the Patent Office, they are entitled to three separate layers of 
appeal as of right.256  On the other hand, when patent eligibility is raised 
in the district court, there is only one layer of appeal available as of right.  
By lodging patent eligibility decisions in the courts, rather than the 
Patent Office, the layers of redundancy are reduced, but not eliminated. 
In addition to the extra layers of redundancy associated with the 
Patent Office deciding patent-eligible subject matter, there is also the 
fact that many of these redundant determinations will cause a delay in 
the issuance of the patent.  For example, if an examiner determines a 
patent application claims ineligible subject matter, the applicant can 
appeal to the PTAB.  If still unsatisfied with the PTAB’s determination, 
the applicant can appeal to the court.  This is potentially three levels 
of decision-making that occur before a patent can be issued.  This 
redundancy has a negative impact on the patentee, because 
enforceable patent rights extend from the date a patent issues until 
twenty years from the date of filing.257  The longer a patent application 
spends in prosecution, meaning the period of give-and-take between 
the applicant and the examiner, the shorter the effective life of that 
patent.  When a patent application is rejected by the Patent Office and 
then that rejection is appealed to the PTAB, any patent that issues will 
have an even shorter effective life.  Particularly in the area of business 
methods (a sub-set of computer technology), appeals are taking a very 
long time.258  The business-method art unit of the Patent Office had 
over double the number of appeals filed than other comparable 
                                               
 256. See supra notes 136–39 (discussing the different stages at which a patent’s 
eligibility is assessed and can be appealed). 
 257. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating a patent’s term shall “begin[ ] on the 
date on which the patent issues and end[ ] 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed in the United States” or, if referencing an earlier 
filed application, from the earliest date). 
 258. See, e.g., Samuel Hayim & Kate Gaudry, PTAB is Bogged down by Eligibility Appeals, 
IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/05/ptab-
bogged-eligibility-appeals. 
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technologies, but significantly fewer appellate decisions rendered.259  
This is due in part to the business-method art unit having a significantly 
greater backlog of unprocessed, or pending, appeals.260  Not only do 
these additional layers of redundancy (and associated delay) harm 
individual patent applicants, they also harm the patent system as a 
whole because it may hinder commercialization and disclosure of 
technological information. 
By vesting patent-eligible subject matter decisions in the courts, 
there would be less redundancy and patents should issue more quickly, 
incentivizing companies to commercialize the technology and bring 
products to market, as well as disclosing technological information in 
the form of both patent documents and marketed products.  The 
flipside, however, is that an ultimate decision on patent eligibility may 
come later, after a company has already commercialized and marketed 
a product.  While this may have negative impact on the company whose 
patent is invalidated at this later date, innovation more broadly would 
benefit from the marketed product. 
The right amount of redundancy cannot just focus on how quickly 
final decisions are rendered.  There should also be a sense of 
uniformity.  There are multiple dimensions of uniformity, both of 
which may be better served by the courts rather than the Patent Office.  
One dimension of uniformity is the idea of “legal uniformity,” meaning 
that the rights in question should be applied consistently throughout 
the entire system.261  A second dimension of uniformity is “adjudicative 
uniformity,” meaning that the claims of a particular patent should be 
construed similarly, regardless of the institution reviewing them.262  
Neither of these concepts of uniformity are enhanced by the current 
system of allowing both the Patent Office and the courts to opine on 
patent-eligible subject matter.  While perhaps none of the institutions 
that decide patent-eligible subject matter has a particular upper hand 
when it comes to uniformity, especially given the last decade’s worth 
of opinions and decisions on the subject, the court system’s expressed 
desire to develop predictability and coherence through law demonstrates 
that the courts could create uniformity, if given the right incentives. 
Limiting patent-eligible subject matter inquiries to the courts would 
permit sufficient redundancy to allow errors to be corrected, by appeal 
                                               
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 21 (2014). 
 262. See id. 
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to the Federal Circuit.  However, it would remove the excess 
redundancies that cut into the effective life of a patent and hinder the 
development of guidance on these issues, as well as limit the ways in 
which uniformity can be undermined.  This in turn should have a 
positive aspect on innovation. 
d. Trust and respect 
Last, but certainly not least, an institution chosen for any given task 
must possess sufficient trust and respect from constituents to fulfill its 
duties.  On the issue of patent-eligible subject matter, many people 
have expressed lack of faith in both the Patent Office and the courts.  
Courts have not been seen in especially positive light, particularly with 
respect to their patent-eligible subject matter decisions; however, if 
possible, the Patent Office’s reputation is even worse.  The lack of trust 
and respect afforded to these institutions can be grouped into two primary 
categories:  the institution’s respect for the subject and the likelihood the 
institution will be subject to capture.  In both categories, the lack of trust 
and respect for the Patent Office is greater than for the courts. 
First, for an institution to be afforded the trust and respect necessary 
to fully develop an area of law, as is necessary to fix patent-eligible 
subject matter, that institution must first have respect for the subject it 
is speaking on—in this case, patent law.  To be fair, courts are not 
always the best guardians of patent law, but often when a court raises 
concerns about the value and purpose of patent law, it is either because 
the judge does not understand the patent system or because the litigants 
appearing before the court make respect for the patent system an issue in 
a case.  The Patent Office (and especially the PTAB), on the other hand, 
have shown disrespect for the very system it was created to execute. 
Rather than implementing an institution that supports the patent 
system, the Patent Office instead has engaged in behavior that 
demonstrates a significant lack of care for patent law.  Commentators 
have noted that PTAB decisions on a number of issues have been 
inconsistent,263 and this is true for patent-eligible subject matter as well.  
Decisions from elsewhere in the Patent Office, including the 
examining corps, are similarly all over the board.  The lack of 
consistency is, of course, concerning, but even more troubling is that 
the PTAB’s jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter is 
                                               
 263. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 103, at 1589 (referencing “complaints by 
the patent bar” due to inconsistencies among PTAB decisions). 
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sometimes provided with very little explanation.264  Rather than being 
able to rely on substantive reasons for why an invention is or is not 
eligible for patenting, the developing jurisprudence provides only 
examples—this invention passes muster, these do not.265  This does not 
demonstrate a concern or respect for patent law and instead may lead 
applicants and others to distrust the Patent Office as an institution to 
develop patent law. 
Moreover, as noted above, respect for the Patent Office has been 
harmed by the PTAB’s reputation as a “killing field” or “death squad” 
for patents.266  The Patent Office obviously serves as the initial hurdle 
for patent applicants and the PTAB may be the final hurdle to cross 
before a patent application is issued.267  More often, however, the 
PTAB will decide the end of a patent application’s life.268  Even if a 
patent application makes it out of the Patent Office as an issued patent, 
the PTAB still comes into play, “killing” these patents in post-grant 
proceedings.269  It is difficult for applicants and patent owners to trust 
an institution that has garnered this negative reputation. 
Second, an institution that is particularly subject to capture by 
special interest groups is unlikely to be given the trust and respect 
necessary for that institution to easily make changes to the law.  As 
between the courts and the Patent Office, it may not be clear which 
institution is most likely to be subject to capture.  Without direct 
evidence of capture, it is possible to infer capture based on tendencies 
of an institution to rule in a particular direction.  In order for these 
tendencies to be dispositive evidence of capture, “one would have to 
                                               
 264. See Matthew Bultman, Fed. Circ. Pushing for More Clarity in PTAB Decisions, 
LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/880041.  In the 
area of patent-eligible subject matter, some of the problem could be that rejections 
are being appealed to the PTAB with scant reasoning from the examiner.  See Robert 
Plotkin, Software Patents are Only as Dead as Schrödinger’s Cat, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 
2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/10/06/software-patents-are-only-as-dead-
as-schrodingers-cat (reporting Patent Office rejections, based on Alice, that provided 
merely form paragraph reasoning). 
 265. Guidance at the Patent Office is specifically being given using references to 
cases where patent eligibility was found or not found.  See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., JULY 2018:  ELIGIBILITY QUICK REFERENCE SHEET:  IDENTIFYING ABSTRACT IDEAS 1 
(2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-qrs_4.pdf. 
 266. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 267. See, e.g., Hockett & DiLeo, supra note 108 (noting that the PTAB occasionally 
finds patent-eligible subject matter, even where an examiner did not). 
 268. See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 269. See, e.g., Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 10, at 955 (noting the high “kill rate” 
of patents during CBM review). 
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assume that no fair-minded [institution] that had listened carefully to 
all perspectives on the question of how best to promote innovation 
could have reached an alternate conclusion.”270  Part of the problem 
with this analysis, however, is which perspectives have actually been 
considered by the institution in question.  Some argue the Federal 
Circuit is exposed to a disproportionate level of pro-patent 
perspectives;271 yet, the court has regularly decided patent-eligible 
subject matter cases against the patent holder.  The Patent Office, on 
the other hand, seems to have been indoctrinated with anti-patent 
perspectives in the past decade.  To succeed in fixing patent-eligible 
subject matter, the institution entrusted with that task must have the 
respect necessary from patent applicants and patent owners, among 
other constituents; the Patent Office’s adoption of anti-patent 
perspectives has harmed its reputation in this area. 
One scholar argues the exact opposite point, namely that patent-
eligible subject matter decisions should be primarily entrusted to the 
Patent Office due to the lack of trust and respect afforded the courts 
as well as the Patent Office’s specific competencies.272  John Golden 
points to the “federal judiciary’s historic struggles with subject-matter 
issues” and Congress’s disinterest as reasons for lodging these 
determinations in the Patent Office, as well as the Patent Office’s 
purported expertise and incentives.273  “The malleability of technology 
and of techniques of patent claim drafting mean that the policing of such 
bounds requires not only continuous vigilance, but also continual 
updating of guidelines for examiners and courts alike.”274  Courts cannot 
do this for so many reasons, as described above.  Congress on the other 
hand is simply too slow, too uniformed, and too liable to special-interest 
capture to be able to adequately address patent-eligible subject matter.275 
However, Golden’s arguments were made prior to when the 
Supreme Court increased the level of confusion surrounding patent-
eligible subject matter through the Alice opinion, and the behavior of 
the courts and Patent Office in the time between Golden’s article and 
now have not borne out his supposed bases.  For example, Golden 
indicates that it would be under “extreme circumstances” that the 
Patent Office (or whomever is determining patent-eligible subject 
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 272. See Golden, supra note 200, at 1044. 
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 274. Id. at 1083. 
 275. See id. at 1091. 
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matter) must determine whether additional steps are merely 
“insignificant extra-solution activity.”276  Based on the way the patent-
eligible subject matter doctrine has played out, this is not an extreme 
solution, but an everyday determination that must be made.  Reality 
has not lived up to Golden’s predictions, and thus his suggestion that 
the Patent Office is the right institution for developing patent-eligible 
subject matter falls a bit flat. 
As a matter of institutional design, the courts are the best institution 
to fix patent-eligible subject matter.  The courts have the proper 
competencies for the task at hand—essentially the development of a 
common law of eligibility.  Additionally, the courts’ priorities are better 
aligned to create a cohesive and predictable doctrine.  There is plenty 
of redundancy in the system if patent-eligible subject matter is left to 
the courts alone and, in fact, removing the extra layers of redundancy 
caused by the multiple layers of potential decision points should also 
improve patent-eligible subject matter law.  Finally, as between the 
courts and the Patent Office, the courts have a slight edge on the trust 
and respect afforded them to be able to implement a better system. 
B.   Administrative Law 
Although concepts of institutional design support vesting patent-
eligible subject matter decisions with the courts, rather than the Patent 
Office, there is an additional argument against the Patent Office 
determining subject matter eligibility.  Specifically, as a matter of 
administrative law, there has been no guidance provided to the Patent 
Office regarding patent-eligible subject matter.  While the 
nondelegation doctrine has significant limitations and has virtually 
never been used to curtail agency action, § 101 includes so little 
guidance to the agency that, should the nondelegation ever become a 
viable argument, patent-eligible subject matter would be a prime 
candidate for inquiry. 
1. Nondelegation doctrine 
The nondelegation doctrine is based on the notion that legislative 
power should be vested in the legislative branch and there are limits to 
how much, if any, of this legislative power should be able to be ceded 
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to another branch of government.277  Despite appearing to be a useful 
doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine does not have any real teeth; 
Congress simply needs to have provided an “intelligible principle” to 
guide the delegate’s exercise of power to pass constitutional muster.278 
The Supreme Court struck down only two delegations under the 
nondelegation doctrine, both in 1935.279  One of these delegations 
“provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the 
other . . . conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the 
basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by 
assuring ‘fair competition.’”280  Since then, challenged delegations 
have withstood the inquiry about whether an intelligible principle has 
been provided, even where the language is quite general.281  For 
example, an intelligible principle has been found when Congress 
required that agency authority not be “unduly or unnecessarily 
complicate[d]”;282 that prices be fixed to be “generally fair and 
equitable”;283 and that the action is in the “public interest.”284 
Although the nondelegation doctrine is generally viewed as a non-
starter, modern administrative law scholars have shown how other 
administrative law doctrines are achieving nondelegation goals by 
forcing agencies to conform to political accountability, deliberation, 
and fairness, as would be the case if Congress had not delegated.285  
The problem is that it would be difficult to force the Patent Office to 
                                               
 277. LINDA TSANG & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44965, PRIVATIZATION 
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 278. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) 
(holding that “[i]f Congress [provides such an] intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power”). 
 279. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935); 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). 
 280. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). 
 281. See id. at 474–75. 
 282. See Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946). 
 283. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
 284. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). 
 285. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 223 (2001) (noting influence of nondelegation principles on doctrines 
of administrative deference); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (arguing that 
nondelegation concerns are behind other modern administrative law doctrines); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000) (substituting canons 
of statutory construction to take the place of the unenforced nondelegation doctrine). 
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act deliberately and fairly under the current formulation of § 101 
because it has absolutely no guidance upon which these attributes 
could even be judged. 
2. An “intelligible principle” for patent-eligible subject matter? 
The authorization for the patent system springs from Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, giving Congress the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”286  Thus, there is a direct 
constitutional delegation to Congress to ensure that science and the 
useful arts (that is, technology) are promoted.  As discussed above, the 
mandate is essentially to promote innovation.  To achieve that 
mandate, Congress has enacted a series of statutes, specifically the 
Patent Act, including § 101.287  However, the only information, or 
guidance, contained in that statute is that patents should cover 
processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, and the 
inventions are subject to the other requirements of the Patent Act.  
The inventions being rejected under § 101, however, are clearly 
processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter.  To the 
extent the Patent Office is denying patents on processes, machines, 
manufactures, or compositions of matter, it is clearly not following the 
statute—and since the Patent Office (whether it be the examining corps 
or the PTAB) does not assess whether science and the useful arts are 
being promoted, or innovation is being encouraged, via its rejections, it 
is also not fulfilling the Constitution’s goals for the patent system. 
To be fair, there is value in delegating decisions of this type to the body 
best equipped to handle them.288  However, for that to be true, there must 
be a clear definition of the problem to be solved, and it must be 
something that the legislature is ill-equipped to handle, while the agency 
it has been delegated to is better equipped.289  While Congress may not 
have the technological know-how necessary to determine what types of 
                                               
 286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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inventions are eligible for patenting, it is not so clear that the question—
that is, promotion of innovation and the types of inventions that will 
achieve that—has been sufficiently defined to delegate it to the agency.  
Rather, notions of innovation do not seem to be part of § 101 of the Patent 
Act, beyond that the invention be new and useful, requirements that are 
covered more completely by other statutory provisions. 
Other delegations to the Patent Office that encompass such wide-
sweeping and important issues are much clearer in their charges.  
Consider, for example, the Prioritization Authority granted to the 
Patent Office in the America Invents Act of 2011.290  Specifically, the 
delegation provides that the Patent Office “may, subject to any 
conditions prescribed by the Director [of the Patent Office] and at the 
request of the patent applicant, provide for prioritization of 
examination of applications . . . that are important to the national 
economy or national competitiveness without recovering the 
aggregate extra cost of providing such prioritization.”291  While this 
delegation calls for complex law and policy-based decisions to be 
vested in the hands of the Patent Office, it provides substantive values 
and direction on which these decisions turn, namely importance to the 
national economy or competitiveness.292 
Additional complex choices delegated to the Patent Office are more 
substantive-procedural, such as those that direct the Patent Office to 
promulgate rules and standards for post-grant review proceedings.293  
This delegation too came with instructions; the Patent Office must 
consider “the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the 
integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the 
Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.”294  
With this level of detail as to the purpose of the delegation, it is easy to 
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2019] INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR INNOVATION 1255 
 
determine whether the Patent Office is fulfilling its delegated role.  
This is not true for patent-eligible subject matter. 
Patent-eligible subject matter is, at this point, truly an open question 
of law and policy—not a scientific or technical inquiry.  To understand 
that it is a legal point, and not science, driving these determinations, 
one only needs to look at the reasoning provided by the courts and the 
Patent Office in recent cases.  Inventions are being deemed ineligible 
for patenting because to patent such an invention “would preempt 
downstream work” or because it “lacks something more,” both of which 
arguably, although not necessarily, could be related to promoting 
science and the useful arts.295  Yet other inventions instead are being 
deemed ineligible because they are simply not desirable or because of 
something unrelated to the innovative nature of the invention 
altogether, like thwarting “patent trolls.”296  Thus, the decisions being 
made about patent-eligible subject matter have very little to do with 
promoting innovation, nor does the promotion of innovation even 
seem to be part of the calculus.  This could be because Congress has 
not provided a sufficient delegation to give the Patent Office the 
guidance it needs to develop patent-eligible subject matter. 
While we generally defer to agencies on matters within that agency’s 
wheelhouse, the open questions surrounding patent-eligible subject 
matter have nothing to do with the Patent Office’s expertise.  In fact, 
the Patent Office has actually been called out for their lack of fitness 
for law and policymaking.297  Specifically, scholars have pointed to the 
Patent Office’s limited authority, lack of institutional competence, and 
susceptibility to capture as being reasons why the Patent Office should 
not be an arbiter of patent policy.298  Further, as discussed above, the 
Patent Office’s primary area of unique expertise is technological.  
                                               
 295. See supra notes 55–56, 62 and accompanying text (discussing preemption and 
“something more” in relation to the Alice decision). 
 296. See, e.g., David Newman, FinTech Sector at Risk from Attack on Patentable Subject 
Matter, FINTECH WEEKLY (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.fintechweekly.com/maga 
zine/articles/fintech-sector-at-risk-from-attack-on-patentable-subject-matter (listing Alice 
as an “over-reaching anti-troll” remedy). 
 297. See supra Section III.A.2.a for more discussion of this point. 
 298. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 168 (2009) (noting that the Patent Office has “virtually no policy 
staff” and has experienced significant political pressure in the past when its leadership 
has indicated a willingness to “take seriously the agency’s role in setting patent 
policy”); Ryan Vacca, Acting like an Administrative Agency:  The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 
MO. L. REV. 733, 755 (2011) (explaining that the Patent Office lacks institutional 
competence and authority for policymaking). 
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However, decisions about patent-eligible subject matter are not being 
made based on technology at all.  Even if the Patent Office knew the 
criteria for developing this doctrine (which it does not), it may not 
have the expertise necessary to do so. 
Although Congress could amend § 101 to provide the Patent Office 
with sufficient guidance to address patent-eligible subject matter, the 
preceding section on institutional design explains why that option is 
not likely to prove successful.  Additionally, there are ancillary benefits 
that may appear if we place the decision-making power over patent-
eligible subject matter solely with the courts. 
C.   Ancillary Benefits 
In addition to situating patent-eligible subject matter decisions in a 
better place, given their reliance on law and policy issues and 
institutional expertise and given the lack of guidance to the Patent 
Office provided by Congress, there are other potential benefits to taking 
these decisions away from the Patent Office and placing them solely in 
the purview of the courts.  These benefits include:  (1) fewer subject 
matter challenges, (2) development of a more extensive jurisprudence, 
and (3) true incentives for the courts to finally get these decisions right. 
First, vesting patent-eligible subject matter decisions in the courts 
will likely result in fewer subject matter challenges, which in turn would 
be good for innovation for the reasons described above.  Because it is 
more expensive, in terms of both cost and resources, to bring a case to 
court versus bringing an administrative proceeding before the Patent 
Office, challenges to patent-eligible subject matter would be brought 
less frequently and with more deliberation, rather than being every 
infringer’s opening parry.  It may seem inapposite that fewer cases 
would allow for a better development of doctrine, but one of the issues 
today is that it is nearly impossible to synthesize the sheer magnitude 
of patentable subject matter decisions that exist.  Reading through the 
unruly mass of cases does not allow anyone to gather a reasonable 
certainty as to what the law is.  Limiting the institutions where subject 
matter challenges can be brought will consolidate the decisions into a few 
places (that is, the courts) where stare decisis matters and will hopefully 
end up creating a coherent body of law.  Thus, putting the courts in 
charge of patent-eligible subject matter will improve both the 
development of the doctrine and the effect of the doctrine on innovation. 
Second, and relatedly, by vesting patent-eligible subject matter 
decisions in the courts, there would (ideally) be a more complete 
discussion of patentable subject matter jurisprudence from which to 
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synthesize and understand the doctrine.  Courts are held to a higher 
standard of written reasoning than is the Patent Office due to rules of 
civil procedure.  If the decisions being made in patent-eligible subject 
matter cases are more detailed, coupled with fewer decisions being 
rendered under the doctrine, then there could quickly develop a more 
coherent and clear jurisprudence about what exactly patent-eligible 
subject matter is (or is not). 
This benefit, however, would require some cooperation from the 
courts.  Some studies have shown that the Federal Circuit, for example, 
has affirmed about 90% of patent-eligible subject matter decisions 
from lower tribunals post-Alice.299  However, the Federal Circuit is not 
helping to clarify the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter.  Post-
Alice, the Federal Circuit decided just over half of its patent-eligible 
subject matter appeals using Rule 36 affirmances, meaning the court 
says nothing at all.300  Most often, Rule 36 affirmances are used when 
the Federal Circuit is reviewing a fact specific issue and the trier of fact 
is entitled to deference, or else where the area of law is well-settled and 
there is little to be gained from yet another opinion on the topic.301  
These Rule 36 affirmances, however, do not help develop the doctrine 
of patent-eligible subject matter.  On the other hand, if the courts, and 
especially the Federal Circuit, are unable to rely on the work of the 
Patent Office, that is if the courts have to make legal determinations 
(and fact findings as necessary) in the first instance for patent-eligible 
subject matter inquiries, courts are more likely to deliver fully 
explanatory opinions that also will allow for a more coherent 
development of the doctrine. 
Third, and in response to the objection that the courts convoluted 
patent-eligible subject matter in the first place, removing the 
determination from the Patent Office would force the courts to 
(eventually) have to pony-up.  Courts have fewer incentives to 
crystallize the law of patent-eligible subject matter when it can always 
be punted back to the Patent Office in post-grant proceedings.  By 
removing that option and forcing the courts to always handle the issue, 
it would be in the best interests of the courts to provide a clear, easy-
to-apply rule to patent-eligible subject matter cases to keep these 
                                               
 299. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 793. 
 300. See id. at 802.  The Federal Circuit decided 31.7 percent via precedential 
opinion and 16.3 percent via nonprecedential opinion.  See id. 
 301. See id. at 803. 
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matters from clogging their dockets.  Thus, the courts would have the 
incentive to completely and clearly develop the doctrine. 
D.   Operationalizing the Proposed Solution 
Admittedly, a proposal to take patent-eligible subject matter 
decisions out of the Patent Office is radical, unpopular, and may not 
seem likely.  However, the Director of the Patent Office, Andrei Iancu, 
made a number of remarks through Fall 2018 hinting at changes to 
patent-eligible subject matter determinations at the Patent Office.  On 
January 7, 2019, the Patent Office issued the “2019 Revised Patent 
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance” document, implementing many 
of Director Iancu’s remarks.302  The revised guidelines and the remarks 
made prior to the publication of the guidelines dovetail nicely with the 
above solution, as well as the pro-innovation goals described:  (1) effective 
and reliable patent rights, (2) commercialization of technology, and (3) 
disclosure in the form of goods and patent documents.  In fact, Director 
Iancu specifically discussed innovation and how the Patent Office could 
act to promote innovative activities.  This section discusses some of 
Director Iancu’s comments and how they may point the way towards 
operationalizing the solution proposed in this Article. 
On September 24, 2018, at the Intellectual Property Owners 
Association Annual Meeting, Director Iancu discussed new guidance 
as to how the Patent Office would be handling patent-eligible subject 
matter determinations.  In summary, Director Iancu stated: 
. . . eligibility rejections are to be applied only to claims that recite 
subject matter within the defined categories of judicial exceptions.  
And even then, a rejection would only be applied if the claim does 
not integrate the recited exception into a practical application.303 
With this guidance, Director Iancu believes that this clarification 
would “help drive more predictability back into the analysis while 
remaining true to the case law that gave rise to these judicial 
                                               
 302. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 
(Jan. 7, 2019); see also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Announces Revised Guidance for 
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/us-patent-and-trademark-office-anno 
unces-revised-guidance-determining-subject. 
 303. See Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Remarks delivered at 
the Intellectual Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-intellectual-
property-owners-46th-annual-meeting. 
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exceptions in the first place.”304  Director Iancu’s remarks also 
provided some guidance regarding the “abstract ideas” exception, 
pointing to three categories:  (1) mathematical concepts like formulas 
and calculations, (2) methods of organizing human interactions, such 
as fundamental economic practices, advertising, and sales activities, 
and (3) mental processes, including forming an observation or 
judgement.305  Additionally, the presence of one of the judicially-
created exceptions would not give rise to the rejection; claims would 
only be rejected if it is a mere principle.  If the exception is practically 
applied, it is not to be rejected.  Most heartening is Director Iancu’s 
acknowledgement that much of the rest of patent-eligible subject 
matter inquiry has conflated other requirements of patentability into 
this threshold analysis: 
It is important to note that the first step of our analysis does not 
include questions about ‘conventionality’ which are addressed in 
Alice Step 2 . . . .  This helps to ensure that there is a meaningful 
dividing line between [§] 101 and 102/103 analysis . . . .  [Similarly, 
the] analysis also does not deny claims as ineligible merely because 
they are broad or functionally-stated or result-oriented . . . .  USPTO 
examiners know, and will receive further guidance and training on, 
how to apply well-defined Section 112 principles.306 
In another speech, Director Iancu summarized his thoughts on 
patent-eligible subject matter as follows: 
Using Section 101, we just have to capture applications that would 
otherwise pass muster under Sections 102, 103, and 112, but are on 
things that we still should not patent.  The Supreme Court has noted 
some specific examples of what we should not patent.  We must be 
careful to not over-read the Court’s exclusions.307 
Instead, as he concludes, the question ought to be whether the patent 
claims are directed toward a defined building block of scientific or 
technological work or toward a practical application of it.308  Director 
Iancu has also regularly spoken to bar and industry groups, stating that 
patent-eligible subject matter should be transparent, that people should 
                                               
 304. See id. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Remarks delivered at the 
Intellectual Property Business Conference (June 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/news-updates/remarks-director-andrei-iancu-ipbc-global-conference. 
 308. Id. 
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be able to know what is eligible for patenting, and that the Patent Office 
should not read the Supreme Court exclusions too broadly.309 
These various remarks, and the revised guidelines implementing the 
ideas raised by Director Iancu, go a long way toward operationalizing 
the proposed solution above.  First, by recognizing that a number of 
non-patent-eligible subject matter doctrines have been grafted into the 
§ 101 inquiry, and suggesting that those principles, like non-
obviousness or enablement, be applied instead of patent-eligible 
subject matter, Director Iancu is increasing the likelihood that patent 
applications will be allowed to issue.  This is because, unlike the 
general case with patent-eligible subject matter decisions, applicants 
regularly amend their claims to overcome other patentability 
rejections.  Applicants will be able to traverse these more aptly-framed 
non-patent-eligible subject matter concerns, allowing patents to issue, 
encouraging patentees to commercialize the technology, and 
enhancing the amount of disclosure available.  Second, Director 
Iancu’s remarks focuses the inquiry of patent-eligible subject matter on 
the technologies that truly raise concern—“basic tools of scientific and 
technological work” like gravity or calculus or “pure mental processes 
such as forming a judgment or observation.”  Unless the claims actually 
recite subject matter falling squarely within one of those categories, 
the inquiry into patent-eligible subject matter is complete.  That is, 
unless the patent application claims gravity, or an elm tree—send it 
through.  The implementation of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject 
Matter Eligibility Guidance document has, in essence, implemented 
the heart of the solution proposed above.  Although the revised 
guidelines have only been in force for a few months, the early results 
seem to be positive—fewer patent applications are being rejected for 
lack of patent-eligible subject matter.310  
Just having the Patent Office allow more patents to issue, however, 
is only part of the story.  The doctrine surrounding patent-eligible 
subject matter must still be fixed and, for the reasons laid out above, 
fixed by the courts.  One other reason in support of the proposal is 
that any changes made at the Patent Office by Director Iancu could be 
                                               
 309. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Iancu:  People Have a Right to Know What is Patent Eligible, 
IP WATCHDOG (June 11, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/11/iancu-
right-know-patent-eligible. 
 310. See, e.g., Matthew Bultman, PTAB Taking Patent Eligibility Revamp to Heart, LAW360 
(Feb. 15, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1130012/ptab-taking-
patent-eligibility-revamp-to-heart (describing the revised guidelines and their effect on 
the PTAB’s reversal rates of examiner determinations of ineligible subject matter). 
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easily undone by the next Director to hold the office.311  Perhaps, in an 
ideal world, Director Iancu’s remarks could form the basis of patent-
eligible subject matter doctrine going forward, but it is more realistic, 
at this point, to view his role in the process as sending innovative 
technology out of the Patent Office where it can benefit society and be 
reviewed by the courts as needed. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent-eligible subject matter is a mess, and the state of the doctrine 
is having a significant negative impact on innovation in this country.  A 
statute that is purposefully broad, to encompass all manners of 
technological progress, has been mishandled by the Patent Office and 
the courts such that it is actually hindering innovation.  Fixing the mess 
requires us to step back and ask what institution may be in the best 
position to deal with the complicated law and policy issues that come 
from the breadth of such a statute—and that is a question of 
institutional design.  Based on the competencies, priorities, redundancies, 
and reputations of the various institutions who could be tasked with fixing 
patent-eligible subject matter, the courts are the best answer. 
Not only do courts make the most sense to answer the important 
open questions about patent-eligible subject matter, but putting this 
issue squarely before the courts will allow for additional benefits and 
should promote, rather than hinder innovation.  With fewer avenues 
available for challenging subject matter eligibility, there should be 
fewer challenges.  This allows for more effective and reliable patent 
rights, but also should permit the doctrine to develop more coherently 
with less precedent to have to synthesize.  Additionally, the courts 
would have a greater incentive to develop a workable, predictable 
doctrine if it was understood that the courts would be the institution 
to regularly apply this doctrine.  Again, this should enhance patent 
rights.  By allowing patents to more easily issue at the Patent Office, 
because applications will not be rejected for lack of patent-eligible 
subject matter, patent rights will be strengthened and, perhaps more 
                                               
 311. See, e.g., Kevin E. Noonan, Director Iancu Produces Glimmer of Patent Eligibility 
Hope, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/09/director-
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importantly, companies will market products based on their 
technology, which is good for society and innovation. 
Take patent-eligible subject matter away from the Patent Office.  
This is admittedly a radical solution.  But as long as we are focused on 
what words to add or subtract from the statute, rather than seeking 
paths forward to encourage innovation, we are never going to fix this 
mess.  By looking at the institution who is best to move the ball forward 
and understand the benefits this choice affords, we can change the 
debate and may eventually see a way to promote innovation and 
progress once again. 
